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This dissertation explores three different but related economic issues in the country of 
Colombia. The first chapter determines the impacts of the prolonged civil conflict suffered in 
Colombia on its unemployment rate compared to other similar Latin American economies. The 
second chapter explores the effect of the presence of illegal leftist and rightist armed groups on 
municipal investments into education, health, infrastructure and environment. The third chapter 
determines the effect of the municipal location relative to a border, on the municipal investment 
decisions into wastewater management.  
Chapter I., co-authored with Alexander Alegría Castellanos PhD., assesses the impact of 
the Colombian conflict on the unemployment rate for the period 1995-2014. Calderon-Mejia and 
Ibañez (2016) assess the effects of forced displacement on the labor market, specifically on 
wages. Our study relies on their findings, and additionally explores the effect of the conflict on 
the unemployment rate in Colombia. To estimate this effect, we use a difference-in-differences 
regression analysis to establish the average treatment effect relative to similar countries. 
Similarly, we use the Synthetic control method to estimate the effect of the conflict on the 
unemployment rate. Using both methods, we find a higher unemployment rate in Colombia 
relative to a counterfactual formed by Latin American countries, after an increase in the intensity 
on the conflict in 1995 due to changes in the drug war strategy. We demonstrate the significance 
of our results using a placebo tests. Overall, our results identify the incidence of the violent 
conflict on the total unemployment rate.  
Chapter II. This study assesses the effects of leftist guerrilla groups and rightist 
paramilitary groups on investments made by the municipal governments in the country of 
Colombia between 2000 and 2010. Specifically, how the presence of illegal armed groups affects 
levels of municipal investments into education, health, infrastructure, environmental protection, 
and other categories. Limits on political participation and institutional weaknesses were key 
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elements propagating violence that disrupted Colombia for years. Searching for solutions to 
these structural problems, Colombia transferred many decision-making responsibilities from the 
central government to regional and local governments in [years]. Paradoxically this 
decentralization opened an opportunity for illegal armed groups to play meaningful roles in local 
political and economic life, eventually taking control over local resources in several 
municipalities. To assess the importance of these groups, empirical analysis exploits annual 
budgetary data for municipalities, information on conflict and violence, and community-level 
socioeconomic data (e.g., income, population). In this analysis, the dependent variables reflect 
municipal investment measured in three ways: total investment, levels of investment categories, 
and categorical proportions of total investment. The primary regressors are the presence of 
rightist paramilitaries and the presence of leftist guerrillas. Results suggest a differentiated 
impact by leftist and rightist groups. In proportional terms, municipalities affected by leftist 
guerrillas allocated less of their investments into environment and infrastructure, yet more into 
health. In contrast, municipalities affected by rightist paramilitaries allocated less of their 
investments in health, yet more into education. 
Chapter III. examines the effect of location on municipal investment into wastewater 
management. Specifically, it explores whether location, relative to regional and international 
borders, plays a role in these investment decisions. Intuitively, transboundary aspects of 
pollution undermine a jurisdictional government’s desire to curtail the amount of pollution 
generated from a source. As the distance between the source and a border falls, the 
transboundary aspects grow since a greater proportion of the detrimental effects of the pollution 
are born by neighboring downstream jurisdictions. Empirical studies consider the problem of 
transboundary pollution by examining various relevant outcomes. Some studies examine 
pollution levels on two sides of an intra-national border. Other studies assess environmental 
quality at intra-national or international borders. Additional studies examine the stringency of 
regulations imposed on and enforcement actions taken against facilities located at or near 
borders. Our study contributes to this literature in two ways by (1) developing a rich conceptual 
framework to explain governmental use of policy tools to induce better environmental 
management by polluters, and (2) exploring the problem of transboundary pollution in the 
context of a developing economy. Using data for municipalities in the country of Colombia 
between 2000 and 2013, we find that municipalities located further from an intra-national border 
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invest more into wastewater management than municipalities located closer to an intra-national 
border, consistent with the hypothesis that regional governments employ policy tools more 
strongly against the former set of municipalities. However, distance to international borders does 
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Chapter I. How does the Colombian Conflict Affects the Unemployment Rate 
(Co-Authored with Alexander Alegría-Castellanos PhD. Candidate) 
1. Introduction 
This chapter assesses the economic impact of the high intensity conflict in Colombia 
between 1995 and 2014. After decades of conflict, and years of negotiation, rebels and 
government finally reached an agreement to end fifty years of war in 2017 (NYT  2016). 
However, this upcoming post-conflict situation requires a better understanding on the economic 
legacies of civil conflict, shedding light on possible recovery strategies, and pointing out a case 
of study for current or upcoming post-conflict situations in different regions.   
The constant state of violence in Colombia represented a threat for the political and 
economic institutions, affecting firm’s decisions to stay or to exit the market (Camacho and 
Rodriguez 2013), that added to the massive forced displacement of civil population toward big 
urban areas, impacted local investments, and created obstacles for foreign investments. On the 
other hand, despite these adverse conditions, political and economic institutions did not suffer 
major transformations, and democracy remains as the form of government (Chacón, Robinson, 
and Torvik 2011); moreover, for some years within this period of violence, Colombia 
experienced positive income shocks and reduced poverty levels in urban areas according to 
official data (World Bank 2017). This context and the recent peace agreements with two of the 
major illegal armed groups, allow us to inquire if the conflict affected the unemployment rate in 
Colombia.  
Several studies assess the socio-economic impact of conflict in Colombia. Some of them 
show the incidence of violent actors on the decision process in policy making (Acemoglu, 
Robinson, and Santos 2013; Chacón, Robinson, and Torvik 2011), and the impact of conflict on 
political elections, and democratic processes. In particular, Acemoglu et al. (2013) use electoral 
and legislative data, and find a strong relation between right wing illegal armed groups and 
electoral outcomes in determined regions in Colombia. Other empirical studies examine the 
impacts of conflict on health outcomes (Camacho 2008), its consequences on forcibly displaced 
households (Ana María Ibáñez and Vélez 2008; Ana María Ibáñez and Moya 2010; Ana María 
Ibáñez and Vélez 2008; Ana María Ibáñez 2009), and its incidence on firms’ exit decisions 
(Camacho and Rodriguez 2013; Rozo 2016). These studies show the welfare losses due to the 
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forced displacement phenomena, provide evidence regarding policy instruments for preventing 
displacement, and determine the impact of conflict on firm’s exits from the market.  
Similarly, unemployment in Colombia is an issue analyzed under several approaches. 
Some authors estimate the effect of non-salary cost on the unemployment rate (Sánchez, Duque, 
and Ruíz 2009; Bernal and Cardenas 2004), the impact of the economic cycle (Nuñez and Bernal 
1997), and the gap between the supply and demand of high quality workers (Nuñez and Sanchez 
1999; Cárdenas and Bernal 1999). Even though most of these studies relate the increase on the 
unemployment rate strictly to macroeconomic conditions, we encounter a correlation between 
the intensification of the Colombian conflict in the 1990s decade, and this increase in the 
unemployment rate for the same period (Figure 3). 
Some other academic works examine the relationship between the labor market and 
forced displacement in Colombia (Ibáñez and Moya 2010; Ibáñez and Vélez 2008; Ibanez 2009; 
Calderón-Mejía and Ibáñez 2016); however, only one of them, specifically, estimates the impact 
of forced displacement on wages in Colombia (Calderón-Mejía and Ibáñez 2016). Using 
instrumental variables to assess the effect of these migrations on the urban labor market, the 
authors find that this phenomenon reduces wages for urban unskilled workers who compete for 
jobs with the arriving population.  Our study aligns with the examination of Calderon-Mejia and 
Ibanez (2016), and contributes to the literature analyzing the unemployment rate using a 
methodology that allows estimating this effect by comparing with a counterfactual, following 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003).  
To estimate the effect of the “high intensity conflict” on the unemployment rate, we 
approach the problem from two similar methods. First, we estimate a difference-in-differences 
model to establish the average treatment effect of the “high intensity conflict” in Colombia 
relative to similar countries within the region; and second, we construct a “synthetic Colombia” 
to estimate the effect of this treatment on the unemployment rate. A main problem is the 
definition of a treated and untreated region within Colombia, due the geographic uniformity of 
the violent events and multiplicity of illegal armed groups (Figure 1). Because of this, we choose 
eight countries in South and Central America, with a relatively low or nonexistent conflict during 
the period of analysis, as control groups (donor countries). 
The untreated countries we choose for the period of study are Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, 
Uruguay, Paraguay (South America), Costa Rica, Panama, and Honduras (Central America). 
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Although all Latin American nations had guerrilla movements after 1960, few of them have a 
history of conflict with the length or intensity of the Colombian conflict. Other countries such as 
Mexico and Brazil share institutional characteristics with Colombia, in particular Mexico; but 
they are not comparable given their economic size relative to the Colombian economy. 
Using the World Development Indicators data base available at the World Bank, we 
obtained information on economic variables (GDP per capita, investments, unemployment by 
sector, population, enrollment, and labor force among others) for all the potential control units 
and Colombia, between 1977-2014.  We also consult public available data from the Center for 
Social Studies at Universidad de los Andes - CEDE and the Conflict Analysis Resource Center - 
CERAC to explore measures on conflict and violence.  
Considering 1995 as a break point for the treatment period, we estimate our difference-in-
differences (DID), and our synthetic control estimated effect. For the DID, we find an average 
treatment effect of 3.7 percentage points in our preferred estimation relative to the control group. 
Meanwhile, our synthetic control shows an average estimated effect of 4.9 percentage points 
relative to the synthetic Colombia. Both estimations represent at least one third of the average 
unemployment rate for the treatment period (1995-2014); however, the synthetic control suggests 
an effect larger than the first average effect estimated by DID. We test our DID results through 
three different standard test, and for the synthetic control method we follow Abadie et al.(2010) 
implementing a placebo test to validate our results. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces a detailed literature 
review describing studies examining economic impacts of conflict worldwide and in Colombia. 
Section 2 offers a brief context on the Colombian conflict pointing out key elements for the 
period selection. Sections 3 and 4 present the empirical strategy for our analysis and the results 
obtained. Section 5 contains some conclusions and comments. An Appendix presents results 
from a series of robustness tests. 
2. The Colombian Conflict and Economic Outcomes  
For the past fifty years, Colombia has faced a constant threat to its institutional stability, 
as well as a situation of violence originated from different armed groups representing multiple 
ideologies, motivations, and tactics. From the mid-sixties communist guerrillas were formed with 
the remains of former bipartisan self-defense armies (GMH 2013; Palacios 2006; Dube and 
Vargas 2013), and later on the seventies and eighties, paramilitary groups and drug cartels arise, 
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both motivated by the control and protection private property of agricultural land, as well as the 
returns of the drug dealing (GMH 2013). Even though there was a constant state of violence, the 
political and economic institutions did not suffer major transformation within the country, and 
democracy has remained as the form of government.  
During the past twenty years the Colombian economy experienced a recovery boosted by 
high prices in commodities such as oil, coal and gold, as well as a persistent reduction in poverty 
levels in urban areas according to official data (World Bank 2017). Similarly, the state has 
negotiated peace agreements with two of the major illegal armed groups during the past fifteen 
years. Given this context, it is valid to question how the armed conflict in Colombia impacted the 
labor market, and how the unemployment rate was affected by the persistence of violent events 
that derived in forced displacement toward main urban areas, and obstacles to local and foreign 
investments.  
Several studies have considered the impact of conflict on economic outcomes using 
different approaches. Most of them examine the impact of political conflict using cross-country 
level data (Alesina et al. 1996; Alesina and Perotti 1996; Barro 1991; Mauro 1995; Venieris and 
Gupta 1986);  finding a negative effect of conflict on investments, savings, and economic 
growth. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003); Grier and Maynard (2016); and Horiuchi and Mayerson 
(2015) use a synthetic control to estimate the impact of political instability and conflict on 
economic outcomes. These works conclude that political instability has a negative impact on the 
economic performance of regions or firms. 
 Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) assess the economic impact of conflict, using the 
terrorist conflict in the Basque Country as a case study. They find that, after the outbreak of 
terrorism, per capita GDP in the Basque Country decreased around 10 percentage points 
compared with the synthetic control region. Grier and Maynard (2016) find that political 
instability affected negatively economic growth while other indicators such as poverty, health 
and inequality improved, and Bove, Elia, and Smith (2016) find a negative but not significant 
effect of conflict on economic growth. To do so, this study compares its results with the results 
of a sample of “cases of studies” using synthetic controls to demonstrate the heterogeneous 
effects of conflict on economic performance.  
Regarding to the effect of conflict within specific countries on microeconomic level 
Shemyakina (2011), Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011), and Eccleston (2011), consider the 
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impacts of conflict or exposure to terrorism on education outcomes (human capital 
accumulation). Eccleston (2011) finds that psychological stress due to exposure to terrorist 
events has negative impacts on early educational attainment and cognitive ability. Similarly, 
Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011), and Shemyakina (2011) find a strong negative impact of 
conflict on educational attainment and schooling, especially among vulnerable populations 
located on regions with high conflict intensity (Chamarbagwala and Morán 2011; Shemyakina 
2011).  
Specifically for Colombia and Bosnia Herzegovina, some scholarly works, assess the 
impact of forced displacement on labor participation and welfare (Ibáñez and Moya 2010; Ibáñez 
and Vélez 2008; Kondylis 2010; Calderón-Mejía and Ibáñez 2016) . Kondylis 2010 finds that 
displaced people in Bosnia are less likely to be working  compared with those  who stayed at the 
same place; her results reveal a differential effect on men whom experience high unemployment 
rates, while displaced women are more likely to drop out the labor force).  Similarly, Ibáñez and 
Moya 2010 examine the effect of forced displacement (caused by conflict) on households’ 
welfare after displacement; and Ibáñez and Vélez 2008 estimate the welfare losses due to forced 
displacement compared to a situation of traditional (unforced or voluntary) migration.    
     Lastly, we want to reference studies that analyze the impact of the conflict on politics, 
labor, and human capital specifically for Colombia. Acemoglu et al., (2013), consider the 
influence of irregular armies on policy decisions, in particular vote shares, finding a strong 
relation between paramilitaries and electoral outcomes in determined regions of Colombia. 
Ibáñez and Moya (2010), contribute to the literature of the conflict in Colombia assessing the 
vulnerability of households through information collected from a representative sample of 
forcibly displaced households in Colombia. These authors find that victims of forced 
displacement face difficulties in generate income and significant drops in consumption, revealing 
the limitation on the effectiveness on the public interventions. Similarly, Ibáñez and Vélez  
(2008) examine the causes of the forced displacement in Colombia, estimate the welfare losses 
and provide some evidence regarding policy instruments for preventing displacement.  
These previous studies open the opportunity to ask: Did the extended violence in 
Colombia have an impact on the labor market? Although our analysis is strongly based on the 
methodology used by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), our study focused on the impacts on 
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unemployment in Colombia, using as a control group a set of Latin American countries which 
constitutes a regional analysis rather than an analysis focused within Colombia.  
3. Context: The Colombian Conflict  
This document investigates on the impact of the armed conflict on the Colombian 
economy during the period 1977-20141.  Colombian armed conflict has lasted for more than a 
half of a century. It has had a multiplicity of internal actors (Colombian Government, 
Paramilitaries, Guerrilla, and Drug Cartels) which appeared in different moments, and played 
different roles in the conflict. Former bipartisan self-defense groups remains derived in the 
formation of communist guerrilla groups after 1964 claiming lack of political representation 
(Palacios 2006; GMH 2013). As a response to these communist groups, the national government 
did incentivize the formation of self-defense (paramilitary) groups as a counter-insurgency 
strategy2. Finally, during the decade of 1980s, the boom in the drug trafficking activity became a 
part of the paramilitary activity and, therefore fueled the rise of violence in the country during 
the decade of 1990s.   
Table 8 in the appendix, presents data collected by the Group of Historical Memory, the 
Center for Conflict studies – CERAC, and the Victims Unit in Colombia. The violent activity, in 
terms of victims, was relatively low during the decade of the 1980s; the number of victims of 
landmines or unexplode ordinance was very low during this decade, and its use increased after 
1990 and it reached the peak in 2006. Other indicators of violence such as the number of 
kidnappings or the number of victims of massacres jumped up after 1988, right after the 
government declared as illegal any paramilitary activity within the country. Finally, although the 
communist guerrillas did not expand or confronted aggressively before the 1980s, they did 
occupy more territory, and structured themselves in a more sophisticated way.  
The peak of the conflict in terms of magnitude of terrorist attacks occurred in the period 
1996-2005. According to the GMH (2013) this period was marked by the simultaneous 
                                                          
1
 According to the General Report of the Historical Memory Group (GMH) (2013), the civil conflict in 
Colombia can be divided into four periods. Our analysis includes the second (1982-1996) and third period 
(1996-2005).   
2
 The lack of confidence of the elites in how the government was handling the conflict with the Guerrillas, 
and the decision of the Guerrilla to reach rural zones, contributed to the emergence and expansion of 
paramilitary groups to protect the interests of the elites. The Colombian government passed the Law 48 of 
1968 to legitimize the creation of these groups
2
. In this sense, the paramilitaries were born as legal groups 
with the mission to help the Colombian army to fight Guerrillas. The Ordinance 813/1989 declared the 
paramilitary groups illegal, but they continued operating until peace agreements in 2005.  
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expansion of the guerrillas and the paramilitaries3, the war against the drug trafficking, and the 
change in the organization of the drug cartels. The magnitude of violent events such as 
kidnappings, massacres, deaths, and landmine victims reached the highest point between years 
1995-2002; and the forced displacement worsened between 2000 and 2008.  
Although the territorial control was still one of the main objectives among the different 
armed actors, the reasons why they fought changed (Salazar and Castillo 2001). Popular 
perception of the leftist guerrillas as defenders of social demands transformed into an image of 
vandalism and common delinquency; in this sense, all illegal armed groups used intimidation, 
killed, and forced displacement of population as instruments to instill the fear among the civil 
population. Thus, the violent groups dominated the population through fear.  
The level of the conflict in this period (1996-2005) reached such a big magnitude that 
according to the GMH (2013), Colombia was ranked second to Sudan in terms of forced 
displaced people. The massive displacement of the population from different regions in 
Colombia, especially toward the main populated cities affected the labor market and the welfare 
of this part of the population.  The Colombian labor market suffered negative impacts on wages 
and employment opportunities (Ana Maria Ibáñez 2009), and the victims of forced displacement 
faced difficulties to generate income, significant drops in consumption, and significant losses in 
welfare (Ibáñez and Moya 2010; Ibáñez and Vélez 2008; Ibanez 2009). It took time for displaced 
people to adjust to a new environment.  
At least four elements boosted the high intensity of the conflict in Colombia at this time. 
First, the 1991 Colombian constitution had the unintended effect of giving illegal armed groups 
the opportunity to control the resources of regions considered as strategic to continue fighting 
(Gutiérrez 2010). Second, changes in policies related to the war on drugs motivated a shift in the 
cultivation and production of coca from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia, bringing an upsurge in 
the price of coca leaf, and as consequence, a new source of revenue to fight for (Angrist and 
Kugler 2008; Mejia and Restrepo 2016, 2013). Third, the new illegal group CONVIVIR emerged 
in 1994 (GMH 2013); this group was created to fight guerrillas in order to control places 
                                                          
3 Also during this period, through the decree 356 of 1994, the Colombian government allowed the 
emergence of new-armed groups named “Convivir” (Private Surveillance Companies). These groups  
defined themselves as anti-subversive Political-Military groups, so they controlled of strategic locations 
(municipalities) of the country and influenced politicians both at local and national level (Acemoglu, 




occupied by guerrilla groups. Lastly, during this period the FARC, the ELN and the AUC 
expanded their members and the territory in which they operated (Arias and Ibáñez 2012). These 
four elements combined to generate a long period of massacres, extortions, selective deaths and 
kidnappings. 
These tactics of domination over the civil population affected the economic activity in 
general.  The extortion had an impact on firm’s decision to stay or to exit the market (Camacho 
and Rodriguez 2013).  Similarly, the level of regional influence and political control of some of 
these violent groups allowed them to take advantage of public resources, and not be prosecuted 
by the national authorities given the prominent mutualism among some illegal groups and 
politicians at the central level of government (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos 2013) . These 
conditions, plus the massive displacement of civil population toward big urban areas, impacted 
local investments, and created obstacles for foreign investment, as well as generated pressure on 
the country’s production, and therefore on the rate of unemployment.    
The violence in Colombia evolved, and took multiple shapes. Many factors contributed to 
the continuation of the conflict. These factors included the limitation of the political participation 
of some armed groups like the guerrillas, the beginning of drug trafficking, and its propagation 
around the country. The poor performance of Colombian institutions, and paradoxically, the 
decentralization opened an opportunity for the illegal armed actors to get involved in the political 
and economic life of local and regional governments taking control over some regions and their 
resources (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos 2013; Gutiérrez 2010; Garay Salamanca and 
Salcedo-Albarán 2010).  Although with different levels of impact, the armed conflict spread in 
one form of violence or another to the whole national territory, as it is shown in the figures from 




Figure 1. Distribution of violence in Colombia 
Source: Group of Historical Memory – Colombia. Report “Basta ya” 
Left: Municipalities affected by forced disappearances  
Right: Municipalities affected by kidnappings  
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
 To study the impact of the conflict in the Colombian economy, we focus our analysis on the 
impact on the unemployment rate. For these we use two strategies. First, using countries in the 
Latin-American region, which have not been involved in a prolonged and intense armed conflict 
as Colombia, we construct a difference-in differences model; second, using the synthetic control 
methodology and the same set of countries we construct a control region that resembles relevant 
economic characteristics of Colombia before the high level of Colombian armed conflict starts. 
For both approaches, we think about Colombian conflict as a natural experiment in which, 
according to the previous description of the armed conflict, Colombia as a whole is the treated 
unit.  
a) Sample Selection and Data 
We propose to estimate a difference-in-differences model, and to create the Synthetic 
control using a set of countries that related to Colombia in terms of institutional framework, 
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income, and even geographically. Although we follow the study proposed by Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) in which they explore regions within Spain, our analysis cannot rely on the 
exploration of the different regions in Colombia. The geographic uniformity of the violent events 
and the multiplicity of illegal armed actors in Colombia are restrictions for the definition of an 
untreated (unaffected) “region” within Colombia by the conflict (e.g., Figure 1). Because of this, 
we choose eight countries in South and Central America as potential control units.  
These countries are not treated with a “high intensity conflict’ for the period of study.  
Considering this, we pick a pool of countries formed by Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, 
Paraguay (South America), Costa Rica, Panama, and Honduras (Central America). Although all 
Latin American nations had guerrilla movements after 1960, few of them have a history of 
conflict with the length or intensity of the Colombian conflict. Most of the countries selected do 
not have any armed conflict for the analyzed period. Other countries such as Mexico and Brazil 
share institutional characteristics with Colombia, in particular Mexico4; but they are not 
comparable with Colombia given their economic size relative to the Colombian economy. 
Including countries with predictor values far different from the treated unit may generate 
problems with the estimation of the synthetic control, and the resulting weights of those 
countries are not going to be of help to the implementation of the synthetic control. Other 
countries such as Nicaragua, El Salvador and Peru are excluded since they face high intense 
armed conflicts for the analysis period. 
 Similarly, we choose the pre-treatment and treatment based on two criteria. First, the 
availability of data for Colombia, and the control countries. Even though the Colombian conflict 
can be traced back from 1950, most of the information regarding the conflict in Colombia is 
available after 1980 (Table 8); besides, the availability of data for Colombia, and many other 
Latin American countries is somehow complete or at least available after 1960. Second, the 
history of the Colombian armed conflict in the recent years that defines the peak of the conflict5 
after 1995 (GHM 2013) as noticed also in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Therefore, the pre-treatment 
period is 1977-1994, and the treatment period is 1995-2014. 
                                                          
4
 Mexico has suffered from an internal conflict related to the drug cartels. This has triggered a big wave of 
criminal violence implying events such as massacres, assassination of politician leaders, and regular 
citizens. The occurrence of these violent events, which include disputes for the political and economic 
control of some parts of the Mexican territory, excludes this country from our potential control group.  
5
 The period between 1995 and 2005 is marked by an increase in violence with drug cartels, guerrillas and 




Figure 2. Violent Events in Colombia (1980-2014) Victims of Massacres and Kidnappings 
 




To implement our strategies, we collected data for these countries from two major sources. 
From the World Development Indicators – WDI platform established by the World Bank, we 
gather data for economic variables such as GDP, GDP per capita, unemployment rate, labor 
force, and Gross fixed formation of Capital; as well as other variables such as population, 
population density, and life expectancy at birth, land area, and gross enrollment for primary, 
secondary and tertiary education. From the International Labor Organization – ILO, we gathered 
data on total employment and employment by sectors (agricultural, industry and services).  
Finally, we also consulted data on conflict variables (i.e., violent events) from the Group of 
Historical Memory – GHM, the Conflict Analysis Research Center – CERAC, and the Unit of 
Victims from the Vice-Presidency office in Colombia.  
b) Differences-in-Differences 
In our first approach we estimate a difference-in-differences (DID) model with the armed 
conflict as our natural experiment; Colombia as the treated unit, and a set of countries within the 
region6 as the untreated or control units (these are countries in the region that have been not 
treated during the period under analysis). As it was mention before, our treatment period starts 
after 1995 and last until 2014. This period is characterized by the high levels of intensity of the 
conflict. Therefore, we have divided the whole period that goes from 1977 to 2014 into a pre-
treatment period from 1977 to 1994 and a post-treatment period from 1995 to 2014. 
In the case of the DID approach we have two groups indexed by treatment status 𝑇 = {1, 0}. 
Where 0 indicates countries not receiving treatment, i.e. the control group, and 1 indicates the 
country receiving the treatment, i.e. the treatment group, which in our case is Colombia. Then, 
every country has two kinds of observations, one pre-treatment and one post-treatment. 
The two outcomes our interest can be model through this equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝑖 + 𝛾𝐷𝑡 +  𝛿(𝐶𝑖. 𝐷𝑡) + 𝜃𝑋 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                               (1) 
Where 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝜃 are unknown parameters, and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is a random, unobserved “error” term 
which contains all determinants of  𝑌𝑖𝑡, which our model omits. It is important to notice that, 𝛽 is 
the treatment group specific effect, 𝛾 is the time trend common to control and treatment effect, 
                                                          
6
 Chile, Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Panamá, Dominican Republic, and Honduras.  
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and 𝛿 is the true effect of treatment. Therefore, the purpose of our interest focused on the 
assessment of 𝛿, for unemployment as outcome variable.  
 The matrix 𝑋  includes covariates such as the GDP per capita in constant 2010 US dollars, the 
gross fixed capital formation as a proportion of the GDP as a measure of investments, and 
general characteristics such as population density, life expectancy at birth, and gross enrollment 
in primary and secondary education.   
c) Synthetic Control 
The second strategy which uses a combination of countries to construct a synthetic region 
resembling Colombia during the pre-treatment period relies heavily on the Synthetic Control 
approach proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). They find that it would be problematic to 
assess the impact of the conflict in the Basque Country simply by a comparison between the 
Basque country and the rest of Spain during terrorism year, since this may not show the true 
impact and pre-terrorism differences between the Basque Country and the rest of Spain. 
Therefore, they approach this problem using a weighted combination of other Spanish regions 
with similar characteristics to the Basque Country before terrorism; they called this weighted 
average as a “Synthetic Basque Country” not affected by terrorism. In other words, this is an 
ideal counterfactual to examine the true impact of conflict.  
5. Results 
a) Difference-in-Differences and Synthetic Control for Unemployment  
i. Differences-in-Differences Analysis 
Table 1 reflects the results for our DID estimation; presenting two sets of estimations. 
First, we have the parsimonious model (columns 1-3); second, we include a set of covariates 
(columns 4-6). In each set, we show the unemployment rate aggregated (total), and disaggregated 
by gender. For both estimations, the parsimonious and including covariates, the DID coefficient 
reflects a positive estimated mean difference on the unemployment rate total, and the 
unemployment rates for females and males. Interestingly, the inclusion of covariates reveals a 
positive expected mean change in the unemployment rate from before to after the onset of the 
“high intensity conflict” period among the control group, in other words, the more complete 
estimation shows a positive effect of time on the unemployment rate in the absence of treatment.     
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Table 1. Differences in Differences unemployment rate 














              
Diff-in-Diff 3.229*** 3.844*** 3.039*** 3.711*** 3.218*** 3.695*** 
 
(1.081) (1.272) (0.961) (0.899) (1.073) (0.822) 
       
Controls 
   
X X X 
       
Observations 380 380 380 349 349 349 
R-squared 0.024 0.025 0.042 0.427 0.397 0.405 
Number of id 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In order to identify causal effects, the DID assumes that prior to the intervention, the 
unemployment rates have identical trends in treatment and control countries. Then, after the 
intensification of the conflict (treatment), the DID estimates how the unemployment rates change 
in the treatment (Colombia) compared to the control countries that did not suffer a “high 
intensity conflict”.  To test the common trend assumption, we apply two standard falsification 
tests. Following Talosaga and Vink (2014),  we try  to estimate directly any difference in trends 
using the following regression model for the pre-treatment (if year < 1995):  
 
  𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽2(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑) + 𝜃𝑋 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                          (2) 
If the common trend assumption holds, the coefficient 𝛽2 should not be statistically 
significant. The second test estimates the model using a “placebo” treatment. We re-estimate the 
DID for the pre-treatment period assuming that the treatment affected at an earlier date. In this 
case the DID coefficient should be not significant and close to zero.  The first test confirms the 
common trend assumption for either the parsimonious case, or including covariates (Table 9 
Appendix).  For the second test we estimate two placebos (Table 10 and Table 11 Appendix), one 
assuming that the treatment started in 1985 (ten years earlier), and second assuming the 
treatment started in 1990. For the first placebo we find a not statistically significant DID 
coefficient for the parsimonious model, but this becomes significant7 when including covariates. 
                                                          
7
 It becomes significant at 10% significance level 
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For the second placebo, neither the parsimonious nor the model with covariates reveals a 
significant DID coefficient.  
Although we find an effect of the “high intensity conflict” on the unemployment rate in 
Colombia, as well as on the female and male unemployment rates; these mixed results for the 
falsification test, do not allow us to draw a conclusion.  However, these results do signal the 
existence of an impact in Colombia with respect to other countries within the region caused by 
the presence of a “high intensity conflict”; in order to establish a consistent conclusion, we rely 
on the synthetic control method proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) applied for the 
Colombian case.  
ii. Synthetic Control 
The key question to evaluate the causal effect in which we are interested is how the 
unemployment has evolved in Colombia after 1994 in absence of the conflict. Certainly, this 
question cannot be answered without the help of a counterfactual because we are not able to have 
both Colombia without and with conflict simultaneously. Therefore, we use the synthetic control 
method as a procedure to estimate that counterfactual.  
Figure 4 shows the trend of the unemployment in Colombia and the rest of countries in 
Latin America8. As we can see, the rest of Latin America does not seem to be a suitable control 
group for our purposes. Although at the beginning of the pre-treatment period (1977-1994), the 
unemployment rate in Colombia was slightly similar than the average unemployment rate for the 
rest of countries in the region, this difference was greater by 1985 when the unemployment rate 
was about 5% greater in Colombia than the average for Latin America. Moreover, on average, 
the unemployment rate for Colombia during the pre-treatment period was 14%; meanwhile the 
average unemployment for Latin America was 9%. Figure 4 suggests that, even before the 
beginning of the “high intensity conflict” period in Colombia, there is a gap between the 
unemployment rate in Colombia and the unemployment rate in the rest of Latin America. As 
suggested by Abadie et al.(2010) and Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) the synthetic control 
method help us to estimate a counterfactual for Colombia from a pool of donor countries for the 
period 1977-1994 
                                                          
8
 The countries included are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador El Salvador, 




Figure 4. Trend in Unemployment rate: Colombia vs. rest of donor countries 
The Table 2 displays the results of our synthetic control in terms of pre-treatment 
characteristics between Colombia and the pool of donor countries. These results compare the 
means of the predictors of unemployment among Colombia, the synthetic Colombia and the 
average of the 8 donor countries, excluding from our donor pool those countries that do not meet 
the characteristics to be part of this9. We see that the average of countries that did not suffer a 
“high intensity conflict” after 1994 does not provide a good control group for Colombia. 
Economic predictors such as the GDP per capita or the investments (Gross fixed capital 
formation) adjust better for the Synthetic Colombia than the average of donor countries; a similar 
situation resembles with other predictors (i.e., life expectancy at birth, population density and 
gross enrollment in secondary education). Notice that it is important to have a donor pool of 
countries showing a high similarity with Colombia, which is the country exposed to the 
treatment (high intensity conflict). In this sense, the synthetic Colombia accurately resembles the 
predictor values for the actual Colombia during the pre-treatment period. According to Abadie et 
                                                          
9
 As we have explained in the empirical framework.  
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al.(2010), this result assures that we have a counterfactual that falls within the convex hull of the 
data. 
Table 2. Unemployment rate predictor means.  
  Colombia Average of control 
countries   Treated Synthetic 
GDP Per capita (constant 2010 US $) 3969.80 3948.49 4599.337 
Gross Enrollment Primary (female and male) 108.07 104.27 107.4469 
Gross Enrollment Secondary (female and male) 47.28 52.40 54.34334 
Life expectancy at birth (age) 67.12 68.65 69.56216 
Population Density (ages 15-64 pop per km sq.)  16.40 16.67 14.94567 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 17.14 17.49 18.88967 
Note: All variables are averaged for 1977-1994 period 
 
The weights of each control country in the synthetic Colombia are reported in Table 3.  
The unemployment rate in Colombia, before the “high intensity conflict” period, is best 
resembled by a combination of Panama, Uruguay and Honduras, which are the only countries 
within our donor pool with positive weights. All other countries within the donor pool have a 
weight of zero for the synthetic Colombia.  
Table 3. Country weights in the Synthetic Colombia 
Country Weight 
Chile 0 








Figure 5 shows the trend of the unemployment rate of Colombia and the synthetic 
Colombia for the period 1977-2014.  We see that the synthetic Colombia presents a similar 
trajectory during the pre-treatment period.  Altogether, this similarity and the similarity among 
the unemployment rate predictors reveal that the synthetic Colombia approximates the 
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unemployment rate that would have occurred in Colombia in the absence of a “high intensity 
conflict” after 1994.  
During the treatment period (1995-2014), there is a gap between the unemployment rate 
for Colombia and the unemployment rate for the synthetic Colombia. This divergence in Figure 5 
suggests a positive effect of the “high intensity conflict” on the unemployment rate in Colombia. 
The estimated effect of this treatment on the unemployment rate is given by the difference 
between Colombia and the synthetic Colombia. On average, the “high intensity conflict” 
contributed with 4.9% of the unemployment rate for the treatment period; in other words, relative 
to the 12.8% average unemployment rate in Colombia for the period 1995-2014 our results 
suggest that the “high intensity conflict” explains more than one third of the unemployment rate.  
i. Robustness of these results 
a) Placebo test 
Even though the figures and the computations based on the divergence suggest that the 
conflict in Colombia has an effect on the variable of our interest we test whether our estimates 
have real significance or they are obtained by chance following Abadie et al.(2010) and Abadie 
and Gardeazabal (2003). In this sense, the questions we must respond is what would it happen 
with our results if we choose a random country besides Colombia? Using the non-treated 
countries within our donor pool, we apply the synthetic control during the sample period of our 
study. For each iteration, we reassign the “high intensity conflict” treatment to one of our 8 
countries, and include Colombia within the set of donor countries. According to Abadie et 
al.(2010) the idea behind this placebo is that if the placebo creates gaps of similar magnitude to 
the gap estimated in our main synthetic, then we can affirm that our results do not provide 
significant evidence of a positive effect of the treatment on the unemployment rate in Colombia. 
On the opposite case, if the gap for Colombia is relatively larger than the ones estimated for the 
non-treated countries, we can say that our results provide significant evidence of a positive effect 




Figure 5. Trends in Unemployment rate: Colombia vs. Synthetic Colombia 
 































































































Figure 7. Trends in Unemployment rate Male: Colombia vs. Synthetic Colombia 
We do this for each one of the other eight countries, and then we compute the estimated 
effect associated with each of the placebo run, as well as the distribution of these effects. Thus, 
we can see where Colombia as the treated unit lies in the distribution; and based on a standard 
level of rejection we can conclude whether the effect is significant or not. Figure 8 shows the gap 
in the unemployment rate for the eight placebos, and Colombia. This figure also reveals that 
Argentina could have fit problems in the pretreatment period; however, its mean squared 
prediction error (MSPE) is 12.1. Removing Argentina, we can see that the effect of the conflict 
















































Figure 8. Unemployment rate gaps in Colombia and placebo gaps in all 8 control countries 
 
 













































































Even though these graphs give us an idea about how severe is the effect using the 
placebos, a more accurate way to evaluate the Colombian gap relative to the gaps obtained for 
the placebos is to analyze the distribution of the effects obtained after running iteratively a 
synthetic for every country. The idea is to calculate a post/pre-“high intensity conflict” MSPE 
ratio and constructs its distribution; based on that we assess the probability of having a value of 
the post/pre-“high intensity conflict” MSPE ratio as large as it is for Colombia.  As it can be seen 
in the Figure 10, the distributions of the post/pre conflict MSPE shows that the value of Colombia 
falls far from the values of the rest of the countries, meaning that our results are significant. The 
probability of observing a behavior similar to Colombia is one in nine.  
 
Figure 10. Post/Pre "High intensity conflict" mean square prediction error 
The average treatment effect for Colombia compared to its synthetic control is an 
increase of 5.4% in the unemployment rate. This value is presented in Figure 11 below by the 
vertical line. That graph shows the cumulative distribution function of average treatment effects 
from systematically assigning treatment to each potential control country. The average treatment 
effect for Colombia is larger than the average treatment effect for all other countries, meaning 
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that the effect of the high intensity of the Colombian conflict on the unemployment rate is highly 
significant. 
 
Figure 11. CDF Average Treatment Effect 
Similar results are achieved when disaggregating the unemployment rate by gender. 
However, the effect on the female unemployment rate seems to be higher than the effect on the 
male unemployment. These results are consistent with other studies on the Colombian labor 
market that find a greater affectation for unemployment within the female population (Nuñez and 
Bernal 1997; Sánchez, Duque, and Ruíz 2009); however, these studies do not include the “high 
intensity conflict” within their analyses (see Figure 6 and Figure 7).  
b) Synthetic control analysis including more countries in the donor pool 
In the section called ”sample selection and data” we have said that even though countries such as 
such as Mexico and Brazil share institutional characteristics with Colombia, they are not 
comparable with Colombia given their economic size relative to the Colombian economy. 
Therefore, including them in the donor pool will not contribute to the implementation of the 
synthetic given that their weights in the donor pool will probably be zero or close to it. In order 
to prove what we were saying in that section, we run the synthetic adding Brazil and Mexico to 
the list of countries that we use as controls. The results in 
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Table 5 show that the weights assigned to Mexico and Brazil are zero which confirms that these 
countries are not suitable to construct the synthetic Colombia. The countries that positively 
contribute to the synthetic Colombia are Panama, Uruguay and Honduras with weights of .38, 
.25, and .37 respectively which are pretty much the same weights these countries got when we 
run the synthetic without Brazil and Mexico (See  
Table 5). 
  Table 4. Unemployment rate predictor means 
 Colombia Average of 
control countries   Treated Synthetic 
GDP Per capita (constant 2010 US $) 3969.80 3948.49 5254.263 
Gross Enrollment Primary (female and male) 108.07 104.27 109.8345 
Gross Enrollment Secondary (female and male) 47.28 52.40 59.63335 
Life expectancy at birth (age) 67.12 68.65 68.86283 
Population Density (ages 15-64 pop per km sq.)  16.40 16.67 15.1299 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 17.14 17.49 19.22486 
Note: All variables are averaged for 1977-1994 period  
These are the predictors including Mexico y Brazil.  
 
Table 5. Country weights in the Synthetic Colombia 
Country Weight 
Chile  0 
Costa Rica 0 
Argentina 0 








We have also run a synthetic including the rest of the countries in the regions
10
. The 
results in the Table 6 below show again Brazil and Mexico with weights zero in the donor pool. 
However, in addition to Panama, Uruguay and Honduras, which had positive weights under our 
                                                          
10
 We included all countries from which we obtained data to run the synthetic, meaning countries without 
many missing values. 
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main specification, now Ecuador, El Salvador, and Bolivia positively contribute to the donor 
pool with weights of 0.03, 0.01, and 0.08 respectively. However, it is important to notice two 
things. First, even though these weights are positive the biggest of them represents only eight 
percent. Second, El Salvador and Bolivia are two countries that faced similar conflicts than those 
faced by Colombia, and then they should not be included as controls in a model explaining the 
effect of a conflict on labor market variables. 
  Table 6. Unemployment rate predictor means 
 Colombia Average of 
control countries   Treated Synthetic 
GDP Per capita (constant 2010 US $) 3969.80 3967.66 4928.259 
Gross Enrollment Primary (female and male) 108.07 104.88 106.7154 
Gross Enrollment Secondary (female and male) 47.28 55.88 57.19691 
Life expectancy at birth (age) 67.12 67.42 66.21285 
Population Density (ages 15-64 pop per km sq.)  16.40 16.47 21.77518 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 17.14 17.14 19.06421 
Note: All variables are averaged for 1977-1994 period  
These are the predictors including with all countries included. 
 
         Table 7. Country weights in the Synthetic Colombia 
Country Weight 
Chile  0 
Costa Rica 0 
Argentina 0 















Analyzing the effects of the conflict in Colombia requires the consideration of multiple 
particularities including its duration, the multiplicity of armed actors involved, and the objectives 
of such armed actors.  We overcome the lack of a counterfactual region within Colombia, by 
using a set of Latin American countries as a control group; and we estimated through two 
methodologies the effect of the “high intensity conflict” in Colombia over the unemployment 
rate.  
Our first approach using a difference-in-differences revealed an effect on the 
unemployment rate. For the period 1995-2014, the DID estimated effect was about 3.7% with 
respect the control countries in our preferred specification (Table 1, columns 4-6); and this 
magnitude replicated for the unemployment rate for females and males. However, these results 
only signaled the impact of the conflict; in order to estimate the true impact of the conflict we 
construct a synthetic Colombia as a counter factual.   
In addition, we found an estimated effect after running the Synthetic for the period 1977-
2014, and we gathered few interesting conclusions. First, from our pool of donor countries only 
three countries obtained a positive weight: Panama, Uruguay and Honduras with weights of 
0.379, 0.25 and 0.371 respectively. Second, the computation of the synthetic control allowed us 
to have an estimated impact of the conflict on the unemployment rate of 4.9% above the 
“Synthetic Colombia”, which represents more than one third of the average unemployment rate 
for the “high intensity conflict” period (1995-2014) in Colombia. It is important to notice that 
there was a differentiated impact for females and males; consistent with other studies on the 
Colombian labor market (Nuñez and Bernal 1997; Sánchez, Duque, and Ruíz 2009), we found a 
greater effect among the female population for the “high intensity conflict” period that the male 
counterpart.  Both, the DID estimated effect and the synthetic control estimate, represent at least 
roughly one third of the average unemployment rate for the post-treatment period. However, the 
synthetic control suggests an effect larger than our DID estimate.  
The analysis conducted in this paper gives an idea of how the conflict affected one labor 
variable as it is the unemployment, the next step could be to explore differentiated effects by 
schooling level and the economy by sectors to identify which segments of the population and 
which parts of the economy were affected by the conflict. Similarly, this study opens two 
questions: first, a question regarding the mechanisms through which this “high intensity conflict” 
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treatment has affected the unemployment rate; one hypothesis may reside in the pressure 
imposed on the labor market in urban areas due the forced displacement phenomena. However, 
we do not test such hypothesis in this document. Second, it is valid to ask if there was any effect 
on the GDP in Colombia given the impact on the unemployment rate; our first approaches to the 
last question do not reveals conclusive results (Appendix).  
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1980  NA  NA 279 10 0 
1981 98  NA 92 62 0 
1982 178  NA 114 106 1 
1983 138  NA 124 193 0 
1984 190 60.039 150 138 1 
1985 180 13.835 346 229 0 
1986 280 15.459 154 125 0 
1987 60 19.099 132 125 0 
1988 444 33.371 335 526 0 
1989 390 29.735 280 290 0 
1990 393 37.671 1122 328 22 
1991 421 33.233 766 418 69 
1992 461 43.935 912 419 151 
1993 389 49.579 354 271 84 
1994 491 54.066 691 187 85 
1995 614 105.466 509 275 130 
1996 565 137.364 1269 463 120 
1997 811 246.95 2100 662 96 
1998 439 239.354 3278 684 58 
1999 682 272.792 3354 1134 54 
2000 1291 598.026 3547 1441 137 
2001 761 653.228 3545 1370 299 
2002 1067 753.678 3306 815 634 
2003 1495 453.126 2303 427 756 
2004 1071 414.909 1773 303 890 
2005 702 473.898 1283 160  1182 
2006 399 454.267 1350 105 1235 
2007 486 476.171 1384 89 978 
2008 427 424.856 1455 78 857 
2009 518 247.75 1252 106 747 
2010 361 191.803 1252 87 552 
2011 353 230.316  NA 80 549 
2012 183 231.683  NA 45 502 
Authors’ elaboration 
Sources: Group of Historic Memory – Colombia
11
; Victims Unit – President Office   Colombia
12
; 
Center for Conflict Studies – CERAC. 
                                                          
11
 http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/basesDatos.html  
12
 https://cifras.unidadvictimas.gov.co/Home/Desplazamiento  
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A. Synthetic Control 
This methodology considers the availability of 𝐽 control “regions” different than the 
treated region, and 𝑊 a 𝐽 × 1 vector of nonnegative weights summing to one.  Each scalar in the 
𝑊 vector (i.e., 𝑤𝑗 ) represents the weight of region 𝑗 in the synthetic control region. The main 
idea is to find a vector 𝑊 in such a way that the synthetic control is the closest to the treated 
region before the beginning of terrorism. Then, given a vector 𝑋1 (𝐾 × 1) of pre-terrorism values 
of 𝐾 economics variables for the treated region, a 𝐾 × 𝐽 matrix 𝑋0 containing the values of the 
same variables for the 𝐽 possible control regions, and a diagonal matrix 𝑉 with nonnegative 
components reflecting the relative importance of the different economic variables, a vector 𝑊∗  
of weights is chosen to minimize (𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑊)𝑉’(𝑋1 − 𝑋0𝑊) subject to 𝑤𝑖 ≥ 0 and 𝑤𝑗 + ⋯ +
𝑤𝐽  = 1.   The objective is to approximate the outcome variable in the treated region 𝑌1  to the 
path this would have in the absence of conflict, so this counterfactual outcome path is calculated 
as the outcome of the synthetic control region 𝑌1
∗ = 𝑌0𝑊
∗. 
B. Common trend assumption – Placebo  
 
Table 9. Test for common trend assumption: test in pre-treatment period 
  (1) (2) 
 
Test Test-controls 
VARIABLES Unemployment Unemployment 
      
Trend -0.074 -0.009 
 
(0.078) (0.089) 
Test1 (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑) 0.119 0.035 
 
(0.135) (0.073) 
   Covariates 
 
X 
Year Dummies X X 
   Constant 9.659*** 54.587*** 
 
(1.709) (8.341) 
   Observations 180 168 
Number of id 10 10 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 10. Test for common trend assumption: Placebo treatment (t < 1985) 
  (3) (4) 
 
Placebo Placebo-controls 
VARIABLES Unemployment Unemployment 
      
Time-treat (𝑡 < 1985) 9.645*** 53.668*** 
 
(1.749) (8.338) 
treatment 1.415 0.985 
 
(4.784) (1.050) 
DID -1.887 -2.796* 
 
(1.459) (1.567) 
   Covariates 
 
X 
Dummy year X X 
   Observations 180 168 
Number of id 10 10 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 11. Test for common trend assumption: Placebo treatment (t < 1990) 
  (5) (6) 
 
Placebo 2 Placebo 2-controls 
VARIABLES Unemployment Unemployment 
      
timetreat3(𝑡 < 1990) 1.091 56.056*** 
 
(1.322) (8.348) 
Treatment 0.731 0.052 
 
(4.884) (1.470) 
DID -0.215 -0.439 
 
(1.628) (1.706) 




Dummy years X X 






   
Observations 180 168 
Number of id 10 10 
Standard errors in parentheses 




C. Employment to population ratio 
In this paper, our main objective is to analyze the impact of the high intensity of the 
conflict in Colombia on the unemployment rate. However, now we want to study another 
measure of the Colombian labor market, which is the employment to population ratio. The  12 
below contains the results of a difference in differences model that is similar to the one we have 
run for the unemployment rate, the only difference is that now the dependent variable is the 
employment to population ratio. These results show that during the period 1995-2014 the effect 
of the conflict on the dependent variable for Colombia was approximately 0% (0.0000864) with 
respect the control countries. 




 Employment to 
population ratio Total 
Employment to population 
ratio Total 
DID 0.0000864*** 0.0000994*** 
  (0.0000259) (0.0000254) 
controls X X 
      
R-squared 0.49 0.43 
Observations 316 342 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
We also run the synthetic for the employment to population ratio as our dependent 
variable. Table 13 and Table 14 show the mean of each predictor used to construct the synthetic 
and the weight of every country in the donor pool respectively. As it can be seen, the synthetic 
values for the predictor are closer to the values of Colombia’s predictors than the average values. 
However, in the Figure 12 it is not clear that the year 1995, which is our cutoff point, defines a 
point in which Colombia and its synthetic diverge. The two lines were different even before our 
cutoff point. Therefore, in this case we cannot say that the high intensity of the conflict is the 






Table 13. Employment to population ratio predictor means 
  Colombia Average of 
control 
countries   Treated Synthetic 
GDP Per capita (constant 2010 US $) 3969.804 3970.623 4599.337 
Gross Enrollment Primary (female and male) 108.0654 108.0721 107.4469 
Gross Enrollment Secondary (female and male) 47.27657 47.28624 54.34334 
Life expectancy at birth (age) 16.40294 16.40365 14.94567 
Population Density (ages 15-64 pop per km sq.)  17.14444 19.03947 18.88967 
Note: All variables are averaged for 1977-1994 
period        
 
Table 14. Country weights 
Country Weight 
Chile 0 









Figure 12. Trends in Employment to population ratio total: Colombia v. Synthetic Colombia 
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D. Gross Domestic Product – Difference in Differences 
 
Table 15. Difference in Differences GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 
  (1) (2) 
 
GDP per capita  GDP per capita  
VARIABLES Diff-in-Diff Diff-in-Diff - Controls 
      





DID -502.775 -495.879 
 
(421.544) (346.072) 
















































Constant 4,290.144*** -4,980.046* 
 
(91.746) (2,607.693) 
   Observations 380 313 
R-squared 0.420 0.721 
Number of Countries (id) 10 10 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Chapter II. The Effects of Illegal Armed Groups on Municipal Investments in 
Colombia 
1. Introduction 
This study assesses the effects of leftist guerrillas and rightist paramilitaries on municipal 
investments in Colombia.  Over the past fifty years, violence in Colombia has evolved and taken 
many shapes. Limits on political participation and institutional weaknesses were key elements 
propagating violence that disrupted Colombia for years. Searching for solutions to these 
structural problems, Colombia transferred many decision-making responsibilities from the 
central government to regional and local governments in [years]. Paradoxically this 
decentralization opened an opportunity for illegal armed groups to play meaningful roles in local 
political and economic life, eventually taking control over local resources in several 
municipalities. (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Gutiérrez, 2010; Garay Salamanca and Salcedo-Albarán, 
2010). 
 After 1991, the central government corrected institutional weaknesses and strengthened 
regulatory capacity with reasonable success. First, the central government defined the 
competencies of departmental (regional) and municipal governments regarding their provision of 
public services, including education, health, and drinking water. Second, the central government 
established criteria that each departmental government would use to certify whether a municipal 
government is worthy of receiving resources from the central and departmental governments 
(Zapata-Cortés 2016). Even though the central and departmental governments give resources to 
municipalities, each municipal government has the authority to choose the budget amounts 
allocated to health, education, infrastructure, environmental protection, and other areas (“general 
purposes”), including ongoing expenditures (e.g., teacher salaries). 
Unfortunately, after 1991, illegal armed groups co-opted municipal institutions, gained 
control over local decisions and resources, and usurped the mantle of the “state” in several 
locales (General 2014; Gáfaro, et al., 2014). These actions of illegal armed groups may have 
impacted municipal investment in total and the allocation of investments across key categories, 
e.g., health, education. This study empirically explores these possible impacts on municipal 
investments. Thus, rather than exploring the causes behind the conflict in Colombia, this study 
focuses on the legacy of the civil conflict. 
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Several studies consider the socio-economic impact of the conflict on Colombia. Some 
studies show the incidence of violent actors on the decision-making process regarding political 
elections, democratic processes, and local collective organizations (Acemoglu et al., Robinson, 
and Santos 2013; Chacón, Robinson, and Torvik 2011; Gáfaro, Ibáñez, and Justino 2014). 
Acemoglu et al. (2013) use electoral and legislative data by region in Colombia to show a strong 
relation between right-wing illegal armed groups and electoral outcomes in certain regions. 
Similarly, Gáfaro et al (2014) assess the impact of non-state armed groups on local collective 
organizations during the armed conflict in Colombia, revealing an increase in overall 
participation in local organizations, driven by the coercion exercised by these irregular armies. 
Other empirical studies examine the consequences of the conflict on forcibly displaced 
households (Ana María Ibáñez and Vélez 2008; Ana María Ibáñez and Moya 2010; Ana María 
Ibáñez and Vélez 2008; Ana Maria Ibáñez 2009). These studies help to determine the welfare 
losses due to forced displacement and provide evidence on the effectiveness of policy 
instruments for preventing displacement. Additional studies explore the impact of conflict on 
labor markets and firms’ exit decisions (Camacho and Rodriguez 2013; Rozo 2016; Calderón-
Mejía and Ibáñez 2016).  
Our study contributes to this literature by exploring the economic impact of civil conflict 
on investments and differentiating these effects by investment type: health, education, 
environmental protection, infrastructure, and other. 
To generate these contributions, our empirical study explores municipal investment in the 
country of Colombia between 2000 and 2010. Our study exploits variation over time and across 
space in municipal investment measured in three ways: total investment, levels of investment by 
category (education, health, infrastructure, environmental protection, and other), and categorical 
proportions of total investment. Similarly, our empirical analysis exploits variation in the 
presence of illegal groups over time and across space, as well as variation between leftist and 
rightist groups. For a given year, leftist guerrilla groups and/or rightist paramilitary groups may 
be present in a particular municipality. Or neither type of group may be present. To 
accommodate this pattern, we generate two primary regressors. One captures the presence of at 
least one guerrilla group in the given year and municipality. The other regressor captures the 
presence of at least one paramilitary group in the given year and municipality. Thus, we explore 
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two types of treatment in our difference-in-difference empirical framework.13 The presence of 
illegal groups also varies over time. In the sample, some municipalities never host illegal armed 
groups. Sadly, most municipalities host at least one type of illegal group. Of these municipalities, 
the temporal pattern varies substantially across municipalities: only the presence of leftist groups 
over time, only the presence of rightist groups over time, first the presence of only leftist groups 
but later the presence of only rightist groups, etc. Given this substantial variation in the temporal 
pattern across municipalities, our difference-in-difference empirical framework does not identify 
a single treatment period. Instead, we compare various treatment periods to the set of periods 
lacking treatment. 
Using this empirical framework, we estimate separately the effects of leftist and rightist 
groups on municipal investments, while testing whether the effects of leftist and rightist groups 
differ. To capture the long run effect of illegal armed groups, our analysis includes three factors 
measuring the presence of each illegal group based on timing: contemporaneous measure, one-
year lagged measure, and two-year lagged measure. We employ fixed effects regression analysis 
to link the presence of illegal armed groups to municipal investments. 
The fixed effects results reveal these relationships. The presence of leftist guerrilla groups 
lowers environmental investment, as a proportion of total investments, by 1 % at the moment of 
presence (i.e., contemporaneous effect). Over the subsequent two years, the lagged effects 
reinforce the contemporaneous effect. The long run effect of the permanent presence is the sum 
of three coefficient magnitudes or * %. Similarly, the presence of leftist guerrilla groups lowers 
infrastructure investment, as a proportion of total investments, by 0.6 % with a one-year lag.  
However, the presence of leftist guerrilla groups raises health investment, as a proportion of total 
investments, by 1.8 % with a two-year lag. In contrast, the presence of rightist paramilitary 
groups does not impact environmental investment or infrastructure structure and actually lowers 
health investment by 4.1 %. Unlike leftist guerrilla groups, the presence of rightist paramilitary 
groups increases educational investment by 2 % based on each presence measure, implying a 
long run effect of 6 %. These results are robust to the inclusion of several control factors as 
                                                          
13
 To assess whether the two illegal groups influence the other group’s impact on municipal investments, 
our empirical analysis also includes an interaction term between these two primary regressors as a third 
regressor. The coefficient of this interaction term never proves statistically significant. Thus, neither 
positive nor negative synergies prove relevant for these two types of illegal groups. 
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regressors, including municipal revenues and transfers from other levels of government (central, 
departmental). 
The rest of the study elaborates on these points. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 
describes the context of the empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the gathered data and 
constructed variables. Section 5 reports and interprets the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Related Literature 
The aim of the political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization in Colombia was to 
give citizens or their locally elected representatives more power in public decision-making and 
autonomy to determine investments including those to protect the natural resources, to improve 
public services such as health and education, and to increase and to maintain infrastructure. 
However, the situation of violence in Colombia and the presence of illegal armed groups 
represented an obstacle for the political and economic institutions (Acemoglu, Robinson, and 
Santos 2013; Gutiérrez 2010; Garay Salamanca and Salcedo-Albarán 2010). As a conflict 
consequence, the decentralization process in Colombia opened an opportunity for these illegal 
groups to get involved within the political and economic issues in the regions.  
Several studies assess the socio-economic legacy of the conflict using different 
approaches. Some of them examine the impact of conflict on economic outcomes. Using cross-
country level data   Alesina et al. (1996); Alesina and Perotti (1996); Barro (1991); Mauro 
(1995); and Venieris and Gupta (1986) find a negative effect of conflict on investments, savings, 
and economic growth. Other studies assess the economic impact of conflict on regions or firms. 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) assess the economic impact of conflict, using the terrorist 
conflict in the Basque Country as a case study. They find that, after the outbreak of terrorism, per 
capita GDP in the Basque Country decreased around 10 percentage points compared with the 
synthetic control region. Grier and Maynard (2016) find that political instability affected 
negatively economic growth while other indicators such as poverty, health and inequality 
improved; and Bove, Elia, and Smith (2016) find a negative but not significant effect of conflict 
on economic growth. To do so, this study compares its results with the results of a sample of 
“cases of studies” using synthetic controls to demonstrate the heterogeneous effects of conflict 
on economic performance. Also on the economic outcomes, other studies examine the legacy of 
conflict on physical capital and investments. Most of these studies consider a scenario of 
interstate wars and the postwar evolution of investments and physical capital  (Davis and 
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Weinstein 2002; Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm 2004; Miguel and Roland 2006). Comparing 
cities and regions, these studies find that cities or regions that were heavily bombed recover 
quicker than those cities untouched by bombing.  
Regarding to the effect of conflict within specific countries on microeconomic level 
Shemyakina (2011), Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011), and Eccleston (2011), consider the 
impacts of conflict or exposure to terrorism on education outcomes (human capital 
accumulation). Eccleston (2011) finds that psychological stress due to exposure to terrorist 
events has negative impacts on early educational attainment and cognitive ability. Similarly, 
Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011), and Shemyakina (2011) find a strong negative impact of 
conflict over educational attainment and schooling, especially among vulnerable populations 
located on regions with high conflict intensity (Chamarbagwala and Morán 2011; Shemyakina 
2011). Specifically for Colombia and Bosnia Herzegovina, some scholarly works, assess the 
impact of forced displacement on labor participation and welfare (Ana María Ibáñez and Moya 
2010; Ibañez and Engel 2007; Ana María Ibáñez and Vélez 2008; Kondylis 2010). Kondylis 
(2010) finds that displaced people in Bosnia are less likely to be working compared with those 
who stayed at the same place; her results reveal a differential effect on men whom experience 
high unemployment rates, while displaced women are more likely to drop out the labor force.  
Similarly, Ibáñez and Moya (2010) examine the effect of forced displacement (caused by 
conflict) on households’ welfare after displacement; and Ibáñez and Vélez (2008) estimate the 
welfare losses due to forced displacement compared to a situation of traditional (unforced or 
voluntary) migration.    
Finally, several studies assess the socio-economic impact of conflict in Colombia. Some 
of them show the incidence of violent actors on the decision process in policy making 
(Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos 2013; Chacón, Robinson, and Torvik 2011), studying the 
impact of conflict on political elections, and democratic processes. In particular, Acemoglu et 
al.(2013) using electoral data by region and legislative data, find a strong relation between right 
wing illegal armed groups, and electoral outcomes in determined regions in Colombia. Similarly, 
Gáfaro et al (2014) investigates the causal impact of non-state armed groups on local institutions 
during the armed conflict in Colombia, defining institutions as local collective organizations 
different from the local authorities or public institutions. This study reveals an increase in overall 
participation in local organization, with a particular strong effect on political organizations, 
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driven by coercion exercised by the irregular armed groups that capture them for war purposes.  
Some other studies consider the impact of conflict on forced displaced population (Ana María 
Ibáñez and Vélez 2008; Ana María Ibáñez and Moya 2010; Ana María Ibáñez and Vélez 2008; 
Ana María Ibáñez 2009). Meanwhile, others examine impacts on health outcomes, firms 
decisions, and labor markets (Camacho 2008; Camacho and Rodriguez 2013; Rozo 2016; 
Calderón-Mejía and Ibáñez 2016). These studies contribute to determine the welfare losses due 
to the forced displacement phenomena, provide evidence regarding policy instruments for 
preventing displacement, determine the impact of conflict on firm’s exits from the market, and 
provide evidence on the impact of forced displacement on wages.  
2.1. Decentralization process 
Colombia is a unitary republic with autonomous regional entities or sub-national 
governments identified as departments (equivalent to U.S. states) and municipalities. 
Departments are territorial entities with autonomy to manage, to plan and to promote socio-
economic development within their own territory. Similarly, the departments are responsible for 
(1) coordinating and complementing municipal action and (2) intermediating between the central 
government and municipalities in able to provide the services determined by the constitution 
(DANE 2007).  A municipality is the basic territorial entity unit with political, fiscal, and 
administrative autonomies within its boundaries. 
In the last three decades of the 20
th
 century, Colombia decentralized its government 
functions. As one of the first steps, the 1968 constitutional reform transferred responsibilities 
from the central government to the departments, allowing departmental governors to design and 
implement development plans and programs, as well as to fulfill other functions that lie below 
the ministerial capacities at the national level. Colombia reinforced this transfer of competencies 
in 1971 with the “Situado fiscal”, which dedicated a proportion of the national income to local 
administration for the provision of municipal services. During the same year, the national 
government crafted a system for sharing sales tax revenues with departments and municipalities, 
defining these revenues available for all purposes (Moncayo Jimenez 2005). 
Decentralization can be horizontal or vertical (Correa and Steiner 1994) . In Colombia, 
this process was vertical because it transferred decision-making and resources to sub-national 
levels – departments and municipalities. In particular, the central government delegated a 
multiplicity of functions to municipalities, including water systems, sewer systems, and 
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environmental management (Valencia-Tello and Karam De Chueiri 2014; Moncayo Jimenez 
2005).14  This process not only included an increase in delegation of functions and resource 
decentralization, but also attempted to change access to and the provision of basic services in all 
the regions of the country. According to González (1994), the decentralized model implemented  
in Colombia was a copy of the fiscal federalism model, which main objective is to achieve local 
efficiency and a reduction in the central government expenditure. However, at the beginning of 
the process some levels of centralization remained, due to institutional weaknesses at the 
municipal level (Valencia-Tello and Karam De Chueiri 2014). Afterwards, the central 
government tried to correct the negative effects of the institutional design and to strength its 
regulatory capacity in two ways: (1) defining clearly departmental and municipal competencies 
regarding the provision of public services, and (2) conditioning municipal resources to a 
certification awarded by each department based on criteria established at the national level 
(Zapata-Cortés 2016). Despite this decentralization, the central government designed a set of 
rules applicable to the budgetary process at the national and sub-national levels of government 
(DDT-DNP 2012) that allowed the central government to maintain some control.15 
By 2000, Colombia had completed its decentralization process. Due to this 
decentralization, municipal governments have the autonomy to govern their own resource 
management constrained by the central government’s retained authority and authority delegated 
to departmental governments.  
2.2. Illegal armed groups and the decentralization 
This document investigates on the impact of the presence of illegal rightist and leftist 
armed groups on municipal investments in Colombia during the period 2000-2010.  Over the 
past fifty years, violence in Colombia has evolved and taken many shapes. Limitations in 
political participation and the weaknesses in the institutions are key elements in the propagation 
                                                          
14
 Act 715, 2001. Art. 76.5.4 Identifies these activities: execute decontamination projects of water streams and water 
deposits affected by wastewater discharges, as well as disposition programs, elimination, and recycling of liquid and 
solid residuals, and controlling air pollutant emissions. 
15
 The central government created the Statue of Budget (Estuto Único de Presupuesto) – EUP, defining the 
budgetary process in Colombia and its different steps. Two main agents operate at the local level: major and 
municipal council. The major is responsible for local economic development, including allocating the municipal 
expenditure and investments according to the approved budget (DDT-DNP, 2012). The municipal council approves 
and authorizes budgetary revenues and expenditures. Similarly, two agents operate at the department level: governor 
and department assembly. Governors are responsible for regional economic development, designing plans and 
programs, and defining revenues and expenditures (DDT-DNP, 2012). The department assembly approves the plans, 
projects, and budgets proposed by the governor. 
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of violence within Colombia. Searching for a solution to these structural problems, Colombia has 
faced a political, administrative, and economic transformation that has transferred decision-
making responsibilities from the Central government to regional governments. Paradoxically, the 
decentralization opened an opportunity for the illegal armed actors to get involved in the regional 
political and economic life taking control over their resources (Acemoglu, et al, 2013; Gutiérrez, 
2010; Garay Salamanca and Salcedo-Albarán, 2010). 
The irregular armies co-opted municipal and departmental institutions, and gained control 
over decisions and resources. According to Gutiérrez-Sanín (2010), this increased capacity of the 
illegal armed groups to block or co-opt municipal and department councils, turned them into 
instruments to articulate themselves into the political and administrative system within the 
regions.  On one hand, the leftist guerrilla groups put pressure on municipal resources to gain 
access to rents through percentages of contracts, and exercising power over governors and 
majors to get strategic advantages. On the other hand, the rightist paramilitary groups took 
advantage of the municipalities in the same way as the leftist guerrillas, but also these groups had 
a greater capacity to co-opt municipal administrations, and possessed a permanent and direct 
contact with national security agencies, governors, majors, and economic elites within the 
regions (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2010).   
These alliances among private economic interest (legal and illegals) had an effect on the 
fiscal and socioeconomic performance at the local administrative level. For instance, the 
incidence of the rightist paramilitary groups on municipal revenues reflected at both rising new 
revenues and the provision of public goods. According to Zapata, Acosta and Gonzalez (2013), 
by the end of the 1990’s decade, the main source of revenue for the municipalities was the 
property tax, along with other minor taxes over commercial or industrial activities, and vehicle 
taxes. Moreover, the collection of such property tax depended excessively on the coercion 
capacity of the municipality over landowners that usually protected themselves with heavy 
armed and trained groups (paramilitaries) (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2010). The scarce regulatory 
capacity affected the fiscal decentralization, and originated the eruption of private interest 
including illegal armed groups, into the decision-making process at the local level in Colombia 






Source: CEDE – Municipal panel on presence of illegal groups 
Authors’ elaboration 






3. Data description   
Using different data sources, we assemble a panel data including information for 1,088 
municipalities in Colombia for the period 2000–2010 (Table 16). We are interested in the 
proportion of investments allocated to environment, infrastructure, education, health, and general 
purpose. The Colombian Ministry of Finances and the National Department – DNP, annually 
collect this data, along with data on municipal revenues. The Center for Development Studies – 
CEDE affiliated to the Universidad de los Andes builds and update a panel for municipal 
budgetary information using these inputs.  Similarly, CEDE assembles a panel with demographic 
variables for municipalities using Census data from the National Statistics Department from 
Colombia – DANE. Finally, we consult conflict and violence data assembled by CEDE and the 
Conflict Analysis Resource Center – CERAC, based on official sources (National Police, 
National Army, and Ministry of Defense), and primary information respectively. 
 
Table 16. Data sources 
Municipality Budgetary Panel 
(2000-2010) 
Center for Development Studies – CEDE Universidad de 
los Andes  
Ministry of Finance Colombia  
Municipality Panel – General 
Characteristics (2000-2010) 
CEDE Universidad de los Andes  
Data on conflict: (1997-2010) 




3.1.Dependent variables:  
Given that our main interest is to explore the effect of the presence of illegal armed 
groups (rightist and leftist) on municipal investments, we consider five investment categories. 
First, environmental investments that include waste water treatment, natural disasters’ 
prevention, as well as conservation, protection, and restoration of natural resources. Second, we 
consider infrastructure investments such as transportation, roads, public housing, and equipment 
(public spaces). Third, we consider education investments, including child protection programs, 
child nutrition, schools, and related expenses. Fourth, we consider health investments that 
include public health programs, vaccination programs, hospitals, and related expenses. Finally, 
we also consider investments in any other concepts called general purposes that account for 
cultural activities, traditions, communitarian organizations, attention to vulnerable population 
(e.g., population under poverty line, veterans, and conflict victims).  
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Table 17. Dependent variables 
Type of investments Description 
Environmental  
Waste water treatment 
Natural disasters’ prevention 





Equipment (public spaces) 
Education 
Child nutrition programs 
Schools   
Health 
Public health programs and campaigns 
Hospitals   
General Purpose 
Cultural activities 
Vulnerable Population attention 
 
3.2.Control sets 
In addition to the different categories of municipal investments, we have data for 
municipal general characteristics. We use as initial control group measures of municipal 
economic activity, and the level of population. These variables are available at aggregated level 
(i.e., GDP total), or disaggregated by economic sector (i.e., agriculture, services, and industry).  
Moreover, we use as additional control variables information on municipal revenues (total, tax, 
and capital revenues) and transfers to the municipalities made by the superior levels of 












Table 18. Descriptive statistics relevant variables 2000-2010 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables (proportion of total investments)   
Environmental Investments 1,088 0.281 2.528 0.058 83.550 
Infrastructure 1,088 0.155 0.058 0.016 0.390 
Education 1,088 0.380 1.762 0.052 37.181 
Health 1,088 0.602 0.194 0.106 2.880 
General Purposes 1,088 0.361 0.393 0.090 8.687 
General Characteristics (log)     
GDP Total  1,084 11.224 1.193 7.195 15.138 
GDP Services 1,084 10.217 1.437 4.765 14.507 
GDP Industry  1,084 9.609 1.546 5.181 14.971 
GDP Agriculture 1,084 9.458 1.285 2.673 12.782 
Population  1,088 9.508 0.980 6.781 13.035 
Budget Variables (log)      
Total revenues 1,088 8.670 0.789 7.157 12.071 
Tax Revenues 1,088 6.086 1.478 1.539 11.390 
Transfers 1,088 6.191 0.381 2.679 7.938 
Capita Revenues 1,088 8.351 0.763 6.769 11.762 
 
4. Methodology and Results 
To assess the effect of the presence of irregular armies on municipal investments in 
Colombia, we estimate a fix-effects model, which allows identifying the impact of presence of 
irregular armies from within-municipal variation across time. Using fixed-effects, we account for 
potential specific factors that may be responsible for municipalities to change investments. 
Similarly, we include year fixed-effects to account for a non-uniform treatment during the period 
of the study (Figure 14).  In other words, we are trying to identify whether the presence of illegal 
armies (leftist or rightist) had an effect on different municipal investments.  
The baseline model is as follows:  
𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝐷𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + υit        (1) 
  
Where 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the investment on municipality 𝑖 at a given year 𝑡; 𝑚𝑖 is a municipal-
specific fixed-effect; 𝛾𝑡 is a time fixed-effect; 𝐷𝑖𝑡 denotes the presence of an illegal armed group 
in a municipality 𝑖 in a year 𝑡; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of control variables including general characteristics to 
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account for potential changes in gross domestic product and population. In all the regressions, 
the standard errors are clustered by municipality to correct for serial correlation.  
 
 
Figure 14. Treatment for at least one illegal group type. Two municipalities 
The effect of the presence of illegal armed groups (leftist or rightist) on municipal investments 
can be estimated using the proposed model, which defines the presence of guerrillas or 
paramilitaries as the treatment under study and municipalities as the treated units. The model 
includes a binary treatment (presence or no presence), where the indicator 𝐷𝑖𝑡 , is equal to one if 
the municipality i is treated at year t and zero otherwise (Figure 14). The municipal investments 
used as dependent variables – total investments (log), environmental, infrastructure, education, 
health, and general purpose – are discussed above in the data section. Using these different types 
of investments allows us to check whether the presence of illegal armed groups (leftist or 
rightist) affects investments in different ways. 
4.1.Presence of leftist guerrillas 
Table 19 presents the results of the fixed-effects regressions for the different types of 
investments using as a treatment the presence of leftist guerrilla groups in the municipality i, at a 
given year t. The results on the first column suggest that environmental investments as a 
proportion of the total investments was 1% less in a municipality with presence of guerrilla at 
year t than municipalities without presence of guerrilla in the same year. This effect seems to be 
persistent and statistically significant after two periods of the initial treatment. Column (2) shows 
the effect of the presence of leftist guerrillas into infrastructure; in this case, municipalities with 
49 
 
the presence of leftist guerrillas have 0.6% less investments into infrastructure as a proportion of 
total investments relative to those municipalities without presence at moment t; this effect takes 
place a year after the initial treatment. Columns (3) – (5) show the results for the proportion of 
investments on education, health, and General purposes respectively, for this case the presence of 
illegal leftist guerrillas does not seem to have an effect.  
 
















            
Presence of 
guerrilla at t -0.00944*** -0.00123 -0.00076 0.01038 -0.06622 
 
[0.00747] [0.72145] [0.91238] [0.52327] (0.49250) 
Presence of 
guerrilla at t-1 -0.00777** -0.00639* 0.01012 0.01712 -0.08272 
 
[0.03273] [0.07491] [0.10824] [0.12410] (0.56725) 
Presence of 
guerrilla at t-2 -0.00668** -0.00364 -0.00269 0.01732 0.06023 
 
[0.03381] [0.29021] [0.67035] [0.13589] (0.19052) 
Presence of 
guerrilla at t-3 -0.00231 -0.00457 0.03905 0.02982 0.10972 
 
[0.47832] [0.15799] [0.23103] [0.18583] (0.30742) 
      General 
characteristics X X X X X 
Year fixed-effects X X X X X 
      Observations 4,498 4,498 4,498 4,498 4,498 
R-squared 0.02559 0.12422 0.04794 0.01061 0.00382 
Municipalities 988 988 988 988 988 
Robust pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
4.2.Presence of Rightist paramilitaries  
Table 20 shows the effects of the rightist paramilitary presence on municipal investments 
using the dummy to define the treatment in the municipality i, at a given year t.   Column (1), (2), 
and (5) suggest no impact on environmental, infrastructure, or general-purpose investments; 
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meanwhile Column (3) shows that municipalities with the presence of rightist paramilitaries have 
2% more investments into education out of total investments than municipalities not treated at 
year t. This treatment seems to affect education investments three periods after the initial 
treatment. Similarly, column (4) suggests that municipalities treated with paramilitary groups’ 
presence have 4.1% less investments on health as a proportion of total investments than 
untreated municipalities.  
Table 20  Baseline model – Rightist paramilitaries 
  Dependent variables 
 












            
Presence of 
paramilitaries at t -0.00142 -0.00052 0.02037** -0.01310 0.00894 
 
[0.68829] [0.88544] [0.02832] [0.25507] [0.88382] 
Presence of 
paramilitaries at t-1 0.00266 0.00303 0.00539 -0.07211 -0.07826 
 
[0.44128] [0.38644] [0.33839] [0.16369] [0.33738] 
Presence of 
paramilitaries at t-2 0.00249 0.00151 0.00876 -0.04090* -0.09497 
 
[0.47295] [0.65219] [0.13437] [0.06140] [0.36213] 
Presence of 
paramilitaries at t-3 -0.00033 0.00144 0.01538* -0.02687 0.19036 
 
[0.91994] [0.66616] [0.07570] [0.24954] [0.11827] 
      General 
characteristics X X X X X 
Year fixed-effects X X X X X 
      Observations 4,498 4,498 4,498 4,498 4,498 
R-squared 0.02116 0.12329 0.04668 0.01592 0.00462 
Municipalities 988 988 988 988 988 
Robust pval in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
4.3. Robustness check 
To check the robustness of our main estimations, we include additional controls within 
for each one of the treatments previously defined.  Table 21 and Table 22 present the results of a 
set of regressions in which we account for other factors that may explain changes in the 
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proportion of municipal investments in the sectors already defined. In particular, we introduce 
variables that account for municipal revenues (total revenues, tax revenues, no tax revenues), and 
transfers from other levels of government (departments and central government).  
In the case of the leftist guerrilla treatment, the coefficients of the contemporaneous 
treatment (t) are similar once we include these additional controls. First, for the environmental 
investments the coefficient at t, and its lags remain at the same statistical significance level, and 
the magnitude of the effect remains around the same levels.  Second, for the infrastructure 
investments, the effect of the leftist guerrilla presence is still significant one period after the 
initial treatment, and the magnitude of the coefficient are somewhat similar. Finally, after adding 
these controls, we find a significant effect of the leftist guerrillas on health investments two 
periods after the initial treatment. Although this constitutes a change with respect the main 
specification, the coefficient changes from 1.7% to 1.8%, and the level of significance in the 
main specification is slightly above 10%. 
These results suggest a consistent effect of the presence of leftist guerrillas on 
environmental, and infrastructure investments as a proportion of total investments, and a likely 
effect on health investments.  On the other hand, these also suggest a consistent impact of the 
rightist paramilitaries on education investments, and health investments.   
For the rightist paramilitary treatment, the results do not seem to change dramatically 
including these additional controls. Table 22 shows that the presence of rightist paramilitary 
groups does not influence investments such as environment, infrastructure, or general purpose. 
However, for the case of education, the inclusion of additional controls changes the effect of the 
rightist paramilitary presence two periods after the initial treatment, and increases the magnitude 
of the significant coefficients. Finally, for the case of health investments, the inclusion of these 
controls do not change the effect of the rightist paramilitaries two periods after the initial 
treatment, but instead increases the magnitude of this coefficient changing from 4% in the 







Table 21 Leftist guerrillas – additional controls 
  Dependent variables 
 












            
Presence of 
guerrilla at t -0.00999*** -0.00163 -0.00236 0.01145 -0.06479 
 
[0.00457] [0.63812] [0.72858] [0.48601] [0.49445] 
Presence of 
guerrilla at t-1 -0.00799** -0.00653* 0.00962 0.01723 -0.08168 
 
[0.02781] [0.06941] [0.12258] [0.12409] [0.56840] 
Presence of 
guerrilla at  t-2 -0.00723** -0.00401 -0.00297 0.01866* 0.06075 
 
[0.02141] [0.24637] [0.63152] [0.09876] [0.18573] 
Presence of 
guerrilla at  t-3 -0.00293 -0.00495 0.03875 0.03149 0.10935 
 
[0.36731] [0.12593] [0.23751] [0.16067] [0.30560] 
      General 
characteristics X X X X X 
Year fixed-effects X X X X X 
Budget variables X X X X X 
      Observations 4,498 4,498 4,498 4,498 4,498 
R-squared 0.02548 0.12446 0.04739 0.01119 0.00385 
Municipalities 988 988 988 988 988 
Robust pval in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
















Table 22 Rightist paramilitaries – additional controls  
  Dependent variables 
 












            
Presence of 
paramilitaries at t -0.00114 -0.00034 0.02131** -0.01392 0.00979 
 
[0.74628] [0.92545] [0.01994] [0.22676] [0.87114] 
Presence of 
paramilitaries at t-1 0.00308 0.00342 0.00668 -0.07383 -0.07757 
 
[0.37213] [0.32898] [0.22669] [0.15574] [0.33571] 
Presence of 
paramilitaries at t-2 0.00285 0.00207 0.01022* -0.04359* -0.09456 
 
[0.41212] [0.53753] [0.08146] [0.05271] [0.36096] 
Presence of 
paramilitaries at t-3 -0.00024 0.00187 0.01675* -0.02912 0.19101 
 
[0.94348] [0.57666] [0.05366] [0.22667] [0.11825] 
      
General 
characteristics X X X X X 
Year fixed-effects X X X X X 
Budget variables X X X X X 
      Observations 4,498 4,498 4,498 4,498 4,498 
R-squared 0.02094 0.12363 0.04623 0.01709 0.00472 
Municipalities 988 988 988 988 988 
Robust pval in parentheses 













The results reveal that those municipalities with presence of leftist guerrilla groups had 
1% less environmental investments as a proportion of total investments at the moment of 
treatment, and then the effect remains after two periods of the initial treatment. Similarly, these 
municipalities had 0.6% less investment into infrastructure as a proportion of total investments 
with respect to those municipalities without presence of leftist guerrillas one year after the initial 
presence of these groups.  For the case of health, the effect takes place until two periods after the 
initial treatment, and shows that municipalities with presence of leftist guerrillas had 1.8% more 
health investments as a proportion of total investments relative to municipalities without 
presence at a given year.  
For the case of the rightist paramilitary presence, the results suggest no impact on the 
environmental, infrastructure, or general-purpose investments; however, they suggest an effect a 
persistent effect on education showing 2% more investments relative to municipalities with no 
presence of paramilitary groups at a given year. Finally, municipalities with presence of rightist 
paramilitaries have 4.1% less health investments as a proportion of total investments relative to 
municipalities with no presence of paramilitaries. These results hold after including additional 
controls to the base line model, that account for other factors that may explain changes in the 
proportion of municipal investments; in particular, we include variables accounting for municipal 
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Chapter III Transboundary Pollution and Municipal Investments into Wastewater 
Management 
1. Introduction 
 This study explores the effect of transboundary pollution on municipal investment into 
wastewater treatment in the context of a developing country, namely Columbia. Pollution 
transcends both domestic and international borders separating jurisdictions. Water pollution 
flows downstream across borders along riverways and streambeds, while air pollution blows 
across borders based on wind direction. This transboundary dimension of pollution generates 
negative externalities. In a sub-national setting, a polluting “upstream” jurisdiction imposes some 
of the detrimental effects of its pollution on its neighboring “downstream” jurisdiction. For 
example, some of the water pollution from one U.S. state flows into another U.S. state. When 
authority over environmental protection is decentralized to some extent within a single country, 
individual regional jurisdictions hold much autonomy over their own governance of pollution 
control. Thus, the negative externality generally remains unresolved. As important, the presence 
of a transboundary externality extends to the international setting. In this setting, a polluting 
upstream country imposes some of the generated detrimental effects on its neighboring 
downstream pollution. Since no supra-national authority fully controls pollution control, the 
international externality remains unresolved. 
 Of course, multiple entities generate pollution within a given jurisdiction or country. 
Excepting highly centralized economies, the national government and regional governments do 
not directly control pollution control or environmental management decisions made by the many 
polluting entities. Instead, the national and regional governments merely influence the polluters’ 
management choices using various policy tools. Our study explores environmental management 
effort expended by municipal governments to treat household-based wastewater. As in most 
countries, the national government and regional governments do not directly control even these 
local government management decisions, relying instead on various policy levers. 
Environmental management expended by polluting entities, including local government 
wastewater treatment plants, helps to reduce pollution. The difference between who bears the 
cost of the environmental management and who enjoys the benefits in the form of reduced 
environmental harm leads to inefficiently low environmental management, which implies 
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excessive pollution. As argued, the inefficiently low level of environmental management reflects 
inefficiently weak use of policy tools on the part of national and regional governments. 
Assessing whether the environmental management level is too low or the policy tool use 
is too weak is quite challenging. The more straightforward analysis is to exploit variation across 
space within a given jurisdiction or country. The regional government should employ its policy 
tools less strongly when the polluting entity lies relatively closer to the regional border and 
employ its tools more strongly when the polluting entity lies relatively far from the regional 
border because the transboundary effect grows as distance to the regional border falls. 
Consequently, the polluting entity expends greater management effort when located further from 
the regional border. Similarly, the national government should employ its policy tools less 
strongly when the polluting entity lies relatively closer to the international border and employ its 
tools more strongly when the polluting entity lies relatively far from the international border. 
Consequently, the polluting entity expends greater management effort when located further from 
the international border. 
In Colombia, wastewater management decisions regarding household-based wastewater 
lie with municipal governments. However, the central government offers direct transfers for 
wastewater management and applies regulatory pressure, while regional governments offer both 
direct transfers and technical assistance, because concerns about water pollution are prominent in 
Colombia. Our study gathers data on an array of rivers, municipalities, and departments and 
defines their position within the country relative to rivers’ directional flow. Then our study 
exploits these data to examine the effect of location on a city’s investment into wastewater 
management. Specifically, it explores whether location, relative to regional and international 
borders, plays a role in these investment decisions.  
Several studies consider the problem of pollution in transboundary settings. Some studies 
examine the level of emissions generated by polluting sources as the dependent variable. Of 
these, some studies examine location relative to intra-national borders. These studies mostly 
capture location by measuring the distance to an intra-national border. The remaining studies 
contrast pollution levels on two sides of an intra-national border, distinguishing between 
upstream and downstream regions. All of these studies reveal the expected effect: the closer is a 
polluting source to an intra-national border, the higher is the pollution level (Cai et al., 2016; 
Helland and Whitford, 2003). Other studies assess ambient water quality as the dependent 
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variable. These studies find evidence of a transboundary effect, at both intra-national and 
international borders, by observing lower quality on the upstream side of a border but higher 
quality on the downstream side of a border (Sigman, 2002; Sigman, 2005). The last set of studies 
examines regulatory actions as the dependent variable. These studies reveal that environmental 
regulation and enforcement are less stringent against facilities located at or near borders. 
Our study contributes to this literature by exploring the problem of transboundary 
pollution in the context of a developing economy. Our study also contributes by developing a 
rich conceptual framework to explain governmental use of policy tools to induce better 
environmental management by polluters. 
To generate these contributions, we first theoretically analyze the problem by developing 
a conceptual framework that captures the institutional setting of water quality protection in 
Colombia. We consider a situation of one country with three different levels of government: 
central, departmental, and municipal. Departments represent regional government entities. The 
country includes one central government, multiple departments, and multiple municipalities. 
Some departments lie within the interior of the country, while other departments lie on the 
country’s border. Similarly, some municipalities lie within the interior of a given department, 
while other municipalities lie on a given department’s border. Municipalities discharge 
wastewater into rivers that flow from one municipality to the next and from one department to 
the next until the river crosses an international border or empties into an ocean. The central 
government employs two policy tools: financial transfers for environmental management and 
regulatory pressure (e.g., fines for violating pollution limits). The departmental government 
employs its own policy tools: financial transfers and technical assistance. From our theoretical 
framework, we derive the following hypotheses: (1) the level of environmental management 
investment is greater for those municipalities located upstream within a department because the 
departmental government employs its policy tools more strongly against these interior 
municipalities, and (2) the level of environmental management investment is greater for those 
municipalities located in departments that lie upstream within a country because the central 
government employs its policy tools more strongly against these interior departments. 
Second, we use data on municipalities in the country of Colombia between 2000 and 
2013. We employ regression analysis to link a municipality’s location, relative to domestic and 
international borders, to the level of municipal wastewater treatment investment. We measure 
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location in two ways: (1) two binary indicators, one contrasting interior and border 
municipalities within a department and a second contrasting interior and border departments 
within the country of Colombia; (2) two distance measures: one capturing the distance to a 
departmental border and a second capturing the distance to an international border. We further 
manipulate the distance measures to construct non-linear specifications: (1) quadratic polynomial 
in distance, and (2) distance splines. Our results reveal that interior municipalities invest more 
than border municipalities and that the distance to a department border positively affects 
municipal wastewater management investments, both consistent with our first hypothesis. 
Results from the quadratic specification demonstrate that the impact of regional border distance 
falls as this distance grows, consistent with a convex relationship between transboundary 
pollution and distance, i.e., transboundary pollution becomes disproportionately more important 
as distance falls. 
We do not reach a similar conclusion for the international setting. The binary indicator 
does not prove significant. The distance measure is significant only in the parsimonious model, 
which includes no control factors. And the quadratic effect is insignificant. 
Collectively, we conclude that intra-national transboundary pollution influences regional 
governments’ policy efforts but international transboundary pollution does not affect the central 
government’s policy efforts. 
The rest of the study elaborates on these points. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 3 describes the context of the empirical analysis. Section 4 constructs a conceptual 
framework. Section 5 describes the empirical strategy. Section 6 interprets the empirical results. 
Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
The aim of political decentralization is to give citizens or their locally elected 
representatives more power in public decision-making and autonomy to determine investments 
including those to protect the natural resources. However, situations in which different political 
jurisdictions share natural resources generate negative externalities, which affect the investment 
decision-making process. According to Olmstead (2014), these negative externalities are 
particularly common for shared water resources. When two or more political jurisdictions share a 
natural resource, location relative to jurisdictional borders affects investment into environmental 
management on the part of polluting entities by influencing the use of policy tools on the part of 
62 
 
jurisdictional governments. The same logic applies to the sharing of a natural resource by 
multiple countries. 
Various studies consider this problem of transboundary pollution. Some studies examine 
pollution levels (air, water, land) from regulated sources as the dependent variable. Of these, 
some examine intra-national borders and most examine the internal distance to an intra-national 
border.  All previous studies reveal the expected effect: the closer is a regulated source to an 
intra-national border, the higher is the pollution level (Cai et al., 2016; Gray and Shadbegian, 
2004; Helland and Whitford, 2003). Other study contrasts pollution levels on two sides of the 
intra-national borders comparing upstream and downstream provinces in China, finding that 
upstream provinces generate higher levels of pollution (Cai et al., 2016).  Other study examines a 
border effect, assessing the effect of the proximity to intra-national borders, it finds that the 
pollution levels are lower the closer to an intra-national border (Gray and Shadbegian, 2004).   
Another set of studies examines international borders. One study examines the effect of 
proximity to an international border on pollution levels. This study finds different results for 
different pollutants when assessing proximity to the Canadian border. The results reveal more 
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) pollution discharged into water but less sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
pollution emitted into the air (Gray and Shadbegian, 2004).   
Similarly, a set of studies examines environmental water quality. Most of these studies 
examine pollution levels using measurement stations as units of observation (Limpscomb and 
Mobarak, 2015; Kahn et al., 2015; Sigman, 2002). Some studies examine intra-national borders 
comparing water quality on two sides of the intra-national border.  In particular, Sigman (2005) 
focuses in the relationship between states in the US with authorization to enforce the Clean 
Water Act and its neighboring states. To do so, the author tries to identify the impact of an 
upstream-authorized state on the water quality in a downstream state. The study reveals that 
being downstream of an authorized state has a negative impact on water quality, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis of free-riding; however, other result reveals zero effects on water 
quality for those authorized states (Sigman, 2005).  Other studies comparing two-sides of intra-
national borders describe expected results, and confirm higher levels of water pollution in 
upstream jurisdictions closer to an intra-national border than the water pollution in downstream 
jurisdictions (Limpscomb and Mobarak, 2015; Kahn et al., 2015).    
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Of these studies, some also examine the internal distance to an intra-national border. 
Sigman (2005) includes three different location variables indicating whether the measurement 
stations are located upstream of a state border, downstream of a state border, or located on river 
when it forms a border between two states.  Under the assumption that far downstream of a 
border, the pollution endowment from upstream free riding diminishes with natural attenuation 
and far upstream, the polluting state experiences almost all the damage, Sigman (2005) also 
considers the proximity to an intra-national border to measure the effect of upstream state’s 
authorization on downstream state’s water quality. The result of this continuous measure 
confirms the initial findings with a discrete approach: upstream state’s authorization has a 
negative impact on the water quality measured at downstream stations within 50 miles of the 
border. The remaining studies reveal similar results examining internal distance to an intra-
national border  (Limpscomb and Mobarak, 2015, Kahn et al., 2015).  Other study examines 
international borders and compares environmental water quality on two sides of international 
borders. This study finds that the level of pollution discharged into a waterbody upstream of an 
international border is higher than other comparable stations (Sigman, 2002).   
The last set of studies examines regulatory actions as the dependent variable (e.g. 
inspections, enforcement, and location permit). Of these, one study examines intra-national 
borders, comparing regulatory actions on two sides of the intra-national border. This study finds 
that regulation agencies are more lenient against regulated sources located upstream of a border 
(Cai et al., 2016). Some other studies examine regulatory actions using the internal distance to an 
intra-national border as the regressor. These studies find that, within a particular region, the 
regulation is less stringent at bordering counties, particularly when it comes to the enforcement 
of pollutant industries or the decision on the location of pollutant industries (Cai et al., 2016; 
Duvivier and Xiong, 2013). Other study examines the effect of proximity to an intra-national 
border on regulation actions.  The results for plants located nearby to the border of states with a 
strong environmental regulation show to fewer inspections and more enforcement in the water 
pollution side, more inspections and enforcement in the air pollution side (Gray and Shadbegian, 
2004). Similarly, this study examine the impact international borders on the regulation finding 
different results for different pollutants; plants located near to the Canadian border face the fewer 
inspections for water pollution (and more BOD pollution), but more enforcement actions for air 
pollution (and lower SO2 emissions) (Gray and Shadbegian, 2004). 
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3. Context  
3.1. Political and Administrative Division 
Colombia is a unitary republic with autonomous regional entities or sub-national 
governments identified as departments (equivalent to U.S. states) and municipalities. 
Departments are defined as territorial entities with autonomy to manage, to plan and to promote 
socio-economic development within their own territory. Similarly, the departments are 
responsible for (1) coordinating and complementing municipal action and (2) intermediating 
between the central government and municipalities in order to provide the services determined 
by the constitution (DANE, 2007).  A municipality is the basic territorial entity unit with 
political, fiscal, and administrative autonomies within its boundaries. 
3.1.2. Geographical and Population Division 
Colombia is a reasonably large country at 1.2 million square kilometers (Murad Rivera et 
al., 2003). Located in the northern extreme of South America, Colombia shares hydrological 
basins with five bordering countries -- Ecuador and Peru in the south and Venezuela and Brazil 
in the east -- and meets the Pacific Ocean in the west and the Caribbean Sea in the north 
(IDEAM, 2015). Colombia governs coasts along the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea, which 
has implied a constant process of negotiation with the neighbors to protect shared water 
resources and marine areas. 
Currently, the country has 1,120 municipalities, each embedded within one of the 32 
departments (DANE, 2007). Some municipalities are located along departmental borders 
(hereafter “border municipalities”). Other municipalities are located within the interior of a 
department (hereafter “interior municipalities”). Similarly, some departments are located along 
an international border or coast (hereafter “border departments”. Other departments are located 
within the Colombian interior (hereafter “interior departments”). 
Based on physical features, regional identity, history, and economic characteristics, the 
National Geographic Institute of Colombia divides the country into four main natural regions:   
(1) Atlantic, formed by coast plains and the Santa Marta Sierra; (2) Pacific, formed by the Pacific 
Ocean coast and the western cordillera; (3) Andean, formed by the central and west cordilleras 
and the valleys of Cauca and Magdalena; and (4) Eastern, formed by plains, the Orinoco basin, 
and the Amazonas basin. Most of the country’s population resides in the Atlantic region. In 
contrast, the Eastern region houses only 2% of the population yet represents 42 % of the total 
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territory (Murad Rivera et al., 2003). During the second half of the 20
th
 century, Colombia 
transformed into a mostly urban country as people migrated to the main four cities. More recent, 
violent conditions in the rural areas has prompted the migration and forced displacement toward 
big cities, increasing the pressure on environmental resources. 
3.2. Municipal Wastewater Treatment and Water Quality in Colombia 
3.2.1. Water Quality Issues 
 Colombia faces increasing environmental issues related to pollution of water sources. 
According to the Ministry of Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development (MAVDT) 
(2004), growing urban areas generate pressure over natural resources, housing and provision of 
public services due to the constant migration of population toward these areas. Therefore, there is 
an increased pollution discharged on water resources coming from municipal sewers, with 
deficient or no treatment. Although Central and local authorities have tried to adopt wastewater 
treatment programs and projects, following international patterns, these have difficulties.  
Besides the pressure over water resources generated by the increase in urban population, 
Colombia faced other issues. The central Government identifies three major issues: First, there 
are environmental and health impacts associated with a decrease in water quality availability and 
restrictions in use. On one hand, ecosystems are affected by the increasing pollution discharged, 
specially by big urban areas (Bogota, Medellin and Cali), according to the National Inventory of 
Water, since 1998 around 1300 waterbodies received pollution from municipal wastewater 
reducing the quality of water sources. On the other hand, there are also effects on public health, 
the increase in the levels of pollution on water bodies, added to low economic levels, lack of 
education, and poor sanitation in some communities, configures a high risk setting for diseases 
with a high economic cost. Along with the pollution generated by domestic agricultural and 
industrial activities, the inexistent or inefficient wastewater treatment also contributes to generate 
environmental and health problems.     
A second issue relates to the wastewater systems build in Colombia and the institutional 
capacity to generate programs toward wastewater treatment. By 2004, the MAVDT reported 237 
wastewater systems build in 235 municipalities, representing only 21.7% of the municipalities in 
the country; including Bogotá, capital of the country; the proportion of population covered 
reached the 64%, and only the 44% excluding Bogotá. Regional environmental authorities - 
AAR and local authorities (municipalities) did not have enough instruments to develop programs 
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and projects for wastewater treatment (MADS 2004). By 2013, the proportion of municipalities 
with wastewater systems in place increased to 43.5% (SSPD 2013), but there is still a deficit in 
the proportion of pollution treated that follows the trends for the Latin American (SSPD, 2013; 
Tiempo, 2017) region where around 31% of water is treated before discharge into waterbodies.  
A third problem identified is the institutional framework. The level of centralization in 
the country added to the different number of public institutions involved in the problem of 
wastewater treatment made difficult the coordination of goals and tasks. At the national level, 
there was not a definition of a state policy in this regard (MADS 2004). At the regional level 
(AAR and Departments) struggled with financial and technical restrictions to provide support to 
the municipalities and to implement the confusing decontamination national policies. Finally, at 
the local level there were not enough efforts planning toward the development of local systems 
for environmental recovery and wastewater treatment. 
In terms of water quality, two of the major rivers in Colombia show different quality 
levels across the country. On one hand, the Magdalena stream shows low water quality levels in 
the municipality of Girardot, department of Cundinamarca, where the Magdalena receives waters 
coming from the Bogotá stream. In this segment, known as the “High” Magdalena, the low water 
quality is explained by the high levels of Total Solid Suspended coming from bordering 
municipalities in Cundinamarca; the “mid” Magdalena also reveals a low water quality condition 
due to the economic activities in neighboring departments (Santander and Boyacá) that affects 
multiple tributaries to the Magdalena stream. Finally, the “low” Magdalena is affected due to 
cattle raising, municipal discharges and gold mining activities (IDEAM, 2014). On the other 
hand, the Cauca stream shows a low water quality index due to the affectation of some of its 
tributaries at different station points. 
3.2.2. Pollutant Discharges and Wastewater Treatment 
The Colombian Hydrology and Meteorology Institute (IDEAM) estimates the pollutant 
net load by discharge points that are discharged into the hydrologic systems coming from 
industrial, domestic, and agricultural sources (IDEAM, 2014). The highest contribution of 
pollution discharge into the water bodies in Colombia is made by the domestic sector (80% on 
average), followed by the industry (19% on average). The urban areas are the major contributors 
to the pollutant discharge being responsible for about 70% on average for the discharges of 
pollutants such as Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD), 
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Total Solid Suspended (TSS), Nitrogen (N), and Phosphorus (P).  Similarly, the IDEAM 
identifies the hydrographic sub-zones under higher pressure due to loads of BOD and COD, 
being the Magdalena has the highest pressure; the “high” Magdalena (interior departments) 
receives 180.781 ton per year from the Bogotá River, being the highest load of BOD in the 
country.  
Table 23 summarizes the amount of pollution removed by the wastewater treatment 
system in placed in the municipalities.  The IDEAM estimates that around a third of BOD and 
COD is removed, and that around half of the pollutants discharged by the industry is removed 
while less than 20% of the pollutants discharge by the domestic sector is removed.  
Table 23 Pollution removed by the wastewater treatment system in Colombia 
Parameter 
Domestic and Industry 
load (kg) 





BOD 1,085,127,286 736,296,107 348,831,179 32.1% 
COD 2,411,886,881 1,648,621,034 763,265,847 31.6% 
TSS 1,517,405,973 1,119,062,421 398,343,552 26.3% 
N 128,890,983 126,345,302 2,545,681 2.0% 
P 32,465,812 31,915,345 550,467 1.7% 
Source: National Water Study (IDEAM, 2014) 
 
a. Regulatory framework 
Due to this context, the country developed an institutional framework to achieve a 
reduction in the amount of pollution generated and discharged into water sources. First, the 
central government designed policies guiding the coordination of environmental management 
among national, regional and local entities, and defined common objectives (SSPD 2013). 
Second, the central government also made efforts implementing a regulatory framework related 
to the wastewater treatment including acts to regulate wastewater discharges, and defining 
instruments (economic, management and institutional) to execute the policies for this sector.  
Regarding the institutional framework, the country defined a structure to design, 
implement and regulate the domestic wastewater treatment. At the national level, there are three 
entities coordinating efforts. The first institution at the central level is the Ministry of 
Environment and Sustainable Development – MADS (by its Spanish name), which has 
traditionally coordinated the environmental policy in Colombia. The MADS dictates the general 
framework for the preservation and restauration of natural resources through the Natural 
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Resources National Code (Executive order 2811, 1974)16.  This defines wastewater treatment 
plants as instrumental in order to preserve the water resources in Colombia; implements a 
national system to deal with environmental issues, and defines its own functions, as well as other 
decentralized entities functions such as Environmental Regional Authorities (Act 99, 1993).  
Within its functions, this ministry defined the parameters required for wastewater 
treatment management plans – PSVM (by its Spanish name) and included these plans as a part of 
the licensing process for those entities in charge of the wastewater treatment management (Res. 
1433, 2004). Similarly, it delegates the approval of the PSVM, and licensing process into the 
Environmental Regional Authorities, and environmental units within the municipalities17. 
Moreover, the MADS established technical guidelines for wastewater treatment management in 
Colombia (Res. 1096, 2000), where it describes the minimum requirements that the process of 
design, construction, technical supervision, operation, and maintenance of wastewater treatment 
systems in Colombia must follow (MADS 2000). 
The MADS also defines the retributive rate for direct and indirect use of water to 
discharge pollution. In 2011, the central government established: 1.) that retributive rates and 
compensations apply too for pollution levels above the limits permitted without exclusion of any 
other preventive or sanction measure, and that the payment of such retributive rates do not 
legalize the discharges object of sanction; and 2.) that the resources collected by the charge of 
the retributive rates and compensations will be allocated to wastewater treatment projects, 
decontamination projects, and water quality monitoring projects (Act 1450, 2011). In this way, 
the MADS defines the guidelines to establish load pollution limits, the process of control of such 
limits, and defines the parameters to calculate the retributive rate for discharge points (Executive 
order 2667, 2012).   
Finally, according to the National Social and Economic Policy Council (Conpes 3177, 
2002), the MADS prioritizes the municipalities to invest in a two-step process. First, the MADS 
prioritizes investments in wastewater treatment plants using a set of minimum conditions: 
1. Municipalities where the discharges produce a substantial negative impact, considering 
the receptor water body assimilation capacity and its effects on public health; 
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 Part III, Title VI. Water uses, conservation, and preservation of water bodies. Chapter II Prevention of pollution 
and pollution control. Art. 134-148.  
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2. Municipalities with sewer coverage above 80% and that have built, or have resources 
guaranteed to build interceptors, collectors and final emissaries of their systems; 
3. Municipalities with water supply systems that include potabilization plants; 
4. Municipalities that, by Act 142, 1994, guarantee the financial, operational and 
institutional strength of their systems. 
Second, the MADS prioritizes municipalities based on additional criteria:  
1. Municipalities where the receptor water body is the water source for water supply 
systems downstream from the discharge point(s) 
2. Municipalities, that from a basin perspective, represent major benefits on the recovery 
and use of the water resource; 
3. Projects with a higher reduction of pollutant load by Peso ($) invested 
4. Projects that formulate the re-use of wastewater 
The MADS dictates technical norms and regulations in coordination with other 
ministries. The second entity at the central level is the Ministry of Health and Social Protection – 
MSPS; this ministry dictates public health and sanitary norms and regulation as well as controls 
water quality for different uses. The MSPS is responsible to establish what uses, that produce or 
could produce water pollution, will require its authorization before asking for authorization from 
the local environmental authority for the use of the resource. Similarly, the MSPS defines the 
desirable and admissible characteristics for water bodies as a measure of sanitary control (Act 9, 
1979).  The MSPS defines the water quality criteria, uses and destinations for water bodies, and 
the rules regarding pollutant discharges into water bodies, establishes minimal requirements for 
discharge points and gives guidelines for discharge permits, discharge plans, and the record of 
the discharges (Executive order 1594, 1984).    
Finally, the third institution at the central level is the National Planning Department – 
DNP, which supports the assessment and formulation of policies, plans and projects within 
multiple sectors including the wastewater treatment sector. Throughout the Social and Economic 
Policy Council – Conpes, the DNP contributes to the design of the National Plan for Wastewater 
treatment management looking to make viable the policies within this sector (DNP, MADS, and 
MDE 2002). The DNP defines funding sources for these projects as well as addressing the 
financial resources from the General National Budget to investments in wastewater management 
according to the priorities defined by the MADS.  
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Similarly, at the regional level there are two entities. The Department (state) participates 
in the planning process, and gives technical and financial assistance to municipalities and entities 
in charge of the wastewater treatment (MADS 2004). The environmental regional authority 
executes the national decontamination policies. As we have mentioned, the MADS delegates into 
the environmental regional authorities the approval of PVMS, and the designation of licenses for 
wastewater treatment plants, define regional discharge limits, in its region (Act 99, 1993).  At the 
local level, the municipality must assure provision of efficient sewer systems (directly or through 
private agent), and invest own resources in water related including wastewater treatment 
projects.     
These entities coordinate actions to achieve the objective of reducing pollution levels on 
water bodies. The central government, throughout the three entities described above, has 
designed and enforced regulations related to environmental protection, national sanitary code, 
and water quality and dumping. The central government has also provided technical norms for 
the wastewater management sector, has implemented retributive rates for direct and indirect use 
of water to discharge pollution, and has delegated into the environmental regional authorities and 
municipalities functions, including the approval of PSMV plans and licensing for wastewater 
management, while still keeping some controls. 
4. Conceptual Framework 
 This section constructs a conceptual framework assessing the effects of transboundary 
spillovers on environmental abatement effort. We consider the situation of one country with 
three different levels of government: central, departmental, and municipal. Departments 
represent regional government entities. The country includes one central government, multiple 
departments, and multiple municipalities. Some departments lie within the interior of the 
country, while other departments lie on the country’s border. Similarly, some municipalities lie 
within the interior of a given department, while other municipalities lie on a given department’s 
border. 
Municipalities discharge wastewater into rivers that flow from one municipality to the 
next and from one department to the next until the river crosses an international border or 
empties into an ocean (or sea). Given this directional flow, we label certain municipalities as 
upstream or downstream from others and certain departments as upstream or downstream from 
others. For simplicity, we consider a single river that flows across the entire country. Moreover, 
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we consider two categories of departments: (1) upstream, interior department and (2) 
downstream, border department. Similarly, within each department, we consider two categories 
of municipalities: (1) upstream, interior municipality, and (2) downstream, border municipality. 
Combining these two sets of categories, we consider four types of municipalities: 
(1) upstream, interior municipality within an upstream, interior department; 
(2) downstream, border municipality within an upstream, interior department; 
(3) upstream, interior municipality within an upstream, border department; and 
(4) downstream, border municipality within an upstream, border department. 
Our conclusions generalize to consideration of an array of rivers and arrays of municipalities and 
departments as defined by their position within the country relative to the rivers’ directional 
flows. 
Municipalities are able to engage in abatement to lower their discharges, denoted as a. 
Each government entity plays its role in promoting these efforts. The municipal government 
invests its own resources into abatement, denoted as am. The central government transfers 
resources to municipal governments, denoted as 𝑎𝑔. The central government also expends 
regulatory efforts, denoted as q, to induce greater abatement from municipalities. These 
regulatory efforts include the provision of permits, imposition of discharge limits, conducting of 
inspections, and application of fines. Departmental governments also transfer resources to 
municipalities for wastewater abatement, denoted as ad. Departmental governments also offer 
technical assistance to municipalities, denoted as η. 
The amount of resources allocated to abatement comes from three sources: municipal 
government’s own investment (𝑎𝑚), departmental transfers (𝑎𝑑), and central government 
transfers (𝑎𝑔). Total abatement effort is as follows: a = am + ad + ag. 
This conceptual framework explores how the central government and departmental 
governments decide how many resources to transfer, how much regulatory effort to expend, and 
how much technical assistance to offer. 
4.1. Central Government and Municipal Government 
For expositional purposes, we first consider the case of two government levels: central 
government and municipal. Thus, we remove the departmental level. The central government 
objective is to maximize central net benefits of abatement, denoted Πc. The benefits of abatement 
divide into three categories: internal to both the municipality and the central government, 
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denoted 𝑣(𝑎) (“internal-internal”), external to the municipality but internal to the central 
government in certain cases, denoted 𝑤(𝑎) (“external-internal”), and external to both the 
municipality and the central government, denoted 𝑧(𝑎) (“external-external”). The internal-
internal benefits differ between the interior municipalities i and the border municipality b, as 
described below. The cost of abatement is denoted 𝑘(𝑎). We assume that the internal-internal 
benefits and the abatement costs do not differ between the interior and border municipalities: 
vi(a) = vb(a) and ki(a) = kb(a). Based on these definitions, social net benefits are shown in 
equation (1): 
𝛱 = 𝑣(𝑎) + 𝑤(𝑎) + 𝑧(𝑎) − 𝑘(𝑎)       (1) 
Municipalities seek to maximize municipal net benefits, denoted Πm, which exclude external 
benefits. Consider interior municipality i. The municipality enjoys only one internal benefit, 
𝑣(𝑎); the other benefits, 𝑤(𝑎) and 𝑧(𝑎), are external to the municipality. In this case, 
independent of transfers, the interior municipality identifies its optimal level of abatement effort 










         (2) 
However, the central government’s net benefits, Πc, are broader for the interior municipality 
because the central government cares about the benefits enjoyed by the downstream border 
municipality. Thus, central net benefits for the interior municipality are shown as follows: 
 𝛱𝑐𝑖 = 𝑣(𝑎) + 𝑤(𝑎) −  𝑘(𝑎)        (3) 
Given this broader set of net benefits, the centrally optimal level of abatement for the interior 










         (4) 
Now consider border municipality 𝑏. Again the municipality enjoys only internal benefits, v(a). 











        (5) 
The central government enjoys the same benefits because the other benefits are external to the 
central government. The central government sets the centrally optimal level of abatement for the 




 +  0 =
𝑑𝑘
𝑑𝑎
          (6) 
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As a reference, the social planner seeks to maximize social net benefits. For the interior 
municipality, the social planner sets the marginal net benefits of abatement to zero. For an 












 = 0. For a border municipality, this condition identifies the socially optimal 









 = 0. 
 In conclusion, for an interior municipality, the municipally optimal abatement level is 





∗ .         (7) 
For a border municipality, the municipally optimal abatement level equals the centrally optimal 




∗  .         (8) 
Comparing equations (4) and (6) reveals that the central government values differently 
abatement for the interior municipality and the border municipality. The centrally optimal 
abatement level for the interior municipality exceeds the centrally optimal abatement level for 
the border municipality: 
𝑎𝑐𝑖
∗ > 𝑎𝑐𝑏
∗  .          (9) 
As important, equation (7) reveals a decision-making conflict for the interior municipality. Left 
to its own devices, the interior municipality expends less abatement effort than the amount 
desired by the central government. 
Given this decision-making conflict, the central government transfers resources to the 
interior municipality, denoted 𝑎𝑔𝑖, so that abatement effort rises directly, and/or apply regulatory 
pressure on the interior municipality, denoted, qi, so that the interior municipality is induced to 
increase its own abatement effort. We first assume that the central government is only able to 
transfer funds. Under this assumption, the central government transfers agi* 𝑠o that the sum of 





∗  .         (10) 
This transfer resolves the discrepancy between aci* and ami*. 




 𝑎𝑔 ≤ ?̅?𝑔 .          (11) 
This constraint does not bind the central government’s transfer unless the following condition 
holds: 
𝑎𝑔𝑖
∗ > ?̅?𝑔 .           (12) 
Given this binding constraint, the central government chooses to expand regulatory efforts qci* in 
order to reach 𝑎𝑐𝑖
∗  conditional upon the transfer of agi*. As long as transfers involve only minimal 
transactions costs, while regulatory pressure clearly involves real costs, e.g., the central 
government must hire inspectors. If regulatory pressure were costless, the central government 
still seeks to obtain the centrally optimal abatement level of 𝑎𝑐𝑖
∗ . Of course, as the costs of 
regulatory pressure, the centrally optimal abatement level falls below 𝑎𝑐𝑖
∗ . For simplicity, we 
assume that regulatory pressure is nearly costless. 
We next focus on the interior municipality’s decision in light of regulatory pressure. 
Regulatory pressure imposes costs on municipality, denoted x. This regulatory cost rises as the 
central government applies more pressure so x is a rising function of q. Moreover, the central 
government applies more pressure when the municipality expends less effort, am. Given these 
connection, we define regulatory costs as this function: x[q(am)]. Thus, the municipality’s net 
benefits equal the following: 
𝜋𝑚 = 𝑣(𝑎) − 𝑘(𝑎) − 𝑥(𝑞(𝑎𝑚))          (13) 
Knowing that the central government applies more regulatory pressure, which increases 
the municipality’s regulatory costs, when the municipality’s abatement investment is lower, the 
municipality chooses to expend greater abatement effort in order to avoid these regulatory costs. 




> 0           (14) 
The appendix describes the situation where the central government cares about the 
discharges generated by the municipalities, imposes limits on these discharges, and applies fines 
for discharges that lie above these limits. 
We utilize equation (13) to derive the municipality’s privately optimal choice of 









          (15) 
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If 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖
∗ then the central government is able to induce the centrally optimal abatement 
level: 
 𝑎𝑚𝑖
∗ + ?̅?𝑔 = 𝑎𝑐𝑖
∗           (16) 
where 𝑎𝑚𝑖
∗  is a function of regulatory pressure and the constraint on central transfers is 
binding. 
In this case, the central government influences abatement in two ways: transfers 
resources for abatement equal to the constraint, 𝑎𝑔𝑖
∗ = ?̅?𝑔 and applies the amount of regulatory 
effort needed to induce the centrally optimal abatement level, 𝑞𝑖
∗ > 0. 
In contrast, for the border municipality, the central government transfers no resources for 
abatement,  𝑎 ∗𝑔𝑏= 0 and applies no regulatory pressure, 𝑞𝑏
∗ =0, because the level of abatement 
chosen by the border municipality equals the centrally optimal abatement level, amb* = acb*. 
Thus, abatement by the interior municipality exceeds abatement by the border municipality: 
𝑎𝑖 =  𝑎𝑚𝑖
∗ + ?̅?𝑔 > 𝑎𝑚𝑏
∗ = 𝑎𝑏         (17) 




∗            (18) 
And regulatory pressure against the interior municipality exceeds regulatory pressure 
against the border municipality: qi* > qb* = 0.  
4.2. Department Government and Municipal Government 
For this sub-section, we assume that the central government plays no role. This new 
situation only involves the department government and two municipalities: one municipality 
interior to the department (interior municipality i) and one municipality on the border of the 
department (border municipality b). We construct a setting in which the departmental 
government plays a role nearly identical to the central government. The only difference involves 
the tools available to the departmental government. Bothe the central government and 
departmental government are able to transfer resources for abatement by the municipality. 
However, unlike the central government, the departmental government is not able to apply 
regulatory pressure; instead, the departmental government can only provide technical assistance. 
The departmental government maximizes its departmental net benefits, denoted Πd. this 
maximization identifies the departmental government’s optimal abatement level, denoted adi*. In 
the absence of technical assistance, the department optimally transfers to the interior 
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municipality resources, denoted ari*, so that the total amount of abatement equals the 
departmentally optimal amount: 
 
𝑎𝑚𝑖
∗ + 𝑎𝑟𝑖 ∗ = 𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗                              (19)  
In contrast, the department government transfers no resources to the border municipality, 
arb*, since the chosen level abatement equals the departmentally optimal level: amb* = adb*. 
Thus, within a department, the interior municipality’s chosen abatement level lies below 





∗           (20) 
 
More important, the interior municipality’s departmentally optimal abatement level lies 
below the border municipality’s departmentally optimal abatement level:  
𝑎𝑑𝑏
∗ < 𝑎𝑑𝑖 
∗             (21) 
However, institutional arrangements may constraint the amount of transfers from the 
departmental government to the two municipalities: 𝑎𝑟 =<  𝑎𝑟~. This constraint binds for the 
interior municipality if this condition holds: 
𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗ > ?̅?𝑟            (22) 
Obviously, this constraint cannot bind the transfer to the border municipality. 
Given this constraint, the department chooses also to offer technical assistance, denoted 
η. This technical assistance facilitates the municipalities’ abatement efforts. To demonstrate this 
point, we modify the abatement cost function so that it depends on technical assistance: k(a,η). 
Abatement costs are still increasing in 𝑎 but now decreasing in η. More important, marginal 





  < 0. 
We modify the municipality’s objective function to reflect the modified abatement cost 
function:  
𝜋𝑚 = 𝑣(𝑎) − 𝑘(𝑎, 𝜂)           (23) 
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In order to demonstrate the role of technical assistance, we capture the marginal value of 
abatement to the municipality as MV = dv/da. The municipality identifies its privately optimal 
choice of abatement, am*, by setting MV = MAC. As technical assistance increases, MAC falls; 
consequently, the privately optimal amount of abatement rises, i.e., as η rises, am* increases. 
Figure 15 captures this relationship between technical assistance and the municipality’s chosen 
abatement level. 
Figure 15. Investment and Technical Assistance 
 
 To accommodate the department’s use of technical assistance, we modify the 
department’s net benefits of abatement:  
𝜋𝑑 = 𝑣(𝑎) + 𝑤(𝑎) + 𝑧(𝑎) − 𝑘(𝑎, 𝜂)         (24) 
If η is nearly costless, the department government still wishes to reach the previously 
identified optimal abatement level, adi*, by offering the necessary technical assistance, denoted 
ηi*. If technical assistance is costly, then the departmentally optimal abatement level when 
technical assistance is costly, denoted 𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗′ , exceeds the departmentally optimal abatement level 
when technical assistance is costless,  𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗ . Consequently, the departmental government offers 
less technical assistance than ηi*, which implies the interior municipality chooses to employ less 
abatement, denoted 𝑎𝑚𝑖
∗′ , so that 𝑎𝑚𝑖
∗′ + ?̅?𝑟 =  𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗′  <  𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗ . Regardless of the costs of technical 
assistance, we can safely conclude that the departmental government offers some positive 
amount of technical assistance to the interior municipality, which clearly exceeds the amount of 
technical assistance offered to the border municipality, which equals zero. 
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4.3. Interaction between Central Government and Departmental Government 
For this sub-section the three level of government interact. First, the municipality chooses 
am; second, the department chooses ad, and the level of technical assistant to municipalities (η); 
and third, the central government chooses 𝑎𝑔 and the level of regulatory efforts (q). 
As mentioned above, within a department the interior municipality’s chosen abatement 
level lies below the departmentally optimal abatement level (𝑎𝑚𝑖
∗ < 𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗ < 𝑎𝑖
∗). This regardless its 
location relative to the international border. Therefore, for any department 𝑎𝑑𝑏
∗ < 𝑎𝑑𝑖 
∗ holds. 
Moreover, considering the technical assistance choice by the department we concluded that the 
departmental government offers some positive amount of technical assistance to the interior 
municipality, exceeding the amount of technical assistance offered to the border municipality.  
Meanwhile, the central government optimal abatement level is greater than the optimal 




∗), even when it comes to regulatory pressure the central 
government decision favors the abatement levels of interior municipalities relative to border 
municipalities (qi* > qb* and 𝑎𝑚𝑖
∗ > 𝑎𝑚𝑏
∗ ).  
Focus on a particular interior department. We have that 𝑎𝑑𝑏
∗ < 𝑎𝑑𝑖 
∗ . In this case, the 
central government optimal abatement level for the border municipalities equals the department 
optimal abatement level (𝑎𝑑𝑏
∗ = 𝑎𝑐𝑏
∗ = 𝑎𝑚𝑏
∗ ). A similar situation occurs with the optimal 






Focus next on a particular border department. We know that 𝑎𝑑𝑏
∗ < 𝑎𝑑𝑖 
∗ . The central 
government optimal abatement level for the border municipalities equals the optimal abatement 
level (𝑎𝑑𝑏
∗ = 𝑎𝑐𝑏
∗ ). Now, for the case of the interior municipalities the central government 
optimal abatement level may not follow the same pattern, considering that these interior 
municipalities are located at a border department. Assuming the central government favors 
interior locations more than border locations, in terms of abatement levels and regulatory efforts; 
then for a border department we have 𝑎𝑚𝑖
∗ < 𝑎𝑐𝑖
∗ < 𝑎𝑑𝑖 
∗ . In other words, optimal abatement levels 
and optimal regulatory effort levels are greater for interior departments than the optimal 
abatement, and optimal regulatory efforts in at a border department.  
Hence, given that the central government prioritizes interior location over closeness to an 





∗ ), and the technical assistance provided to the municipalities, regardless of their location 
relative to international borders, we have a relationship summarized in Figure 16 . 
Figure 16. Hypotheses on Wastewater Treatment level 
 
 
5. Empirical Strategy 
This study analyzes the effect of location relative to borders on municipal investments into 
wastewater treatment management. To do so, we assess the water related investments at the municipal 
level in 1,120 municipalities in Colombia from 2000 to 2013. First, we identify municipalities located at 
the border or at the interior of a department (state), as a discrete explanatory variable to identify 
differences in the amount of water related investments. Second, we use a continuous measure of distance 
to explain differences on investment levels.  For both cases, we expect that the location of the 
municipality relative to a border have an impact on the amount of investments on wastewater treatment 
management. 
5.1. Sample Selection and Data 
Using different data sources, we assemble a panel data including information for 
municipalities 1120 in Colombia for the period 2000–2013. We are interested in the investments 
allocated to water related issues by municipality. The Colombian Ministry of Finances and the 
National Department – DNP, annually collect this data, along with data on municipal revenues. 
The Center for Development Studies – CEDE affiliated to the Universidad de los Andes built a 
panel for municipal budgetary information using these inputs.  Similarly, CEDE assembles a 
panel with demographic variables for municipalities using Census data from the National 
Statistics Department from Colombia – DANE. Finally, we consult conflict and violence data 
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assembled by CEDE and the Conflict Analysis Resource Center – CERAC, based on official 
sources (National Police, National Army, and Ministry of Defense), and primary information 
respectively. 
We also use data from the Hydrology and Meteorology Institute (IDEAM) and the 
Geographic Institute (IGAC), to gather geographic information on Water bodies (water streams, 
rivers, basins), and municipal and departmental boundaries. These are the inputs to define the 
location of each municipality with respect to a department border or an international border. 
First, we define the set of main rivers that we include within our sample. Based on the 
criteria, and information publicly provided by IGAC, we use a set of 124 rivers, joining two sets 
of water streams information: double drainage and simple drainage.18 Second, using IGAC and 
IDEAM definitions on the main hydrological regions and minor basins in Colombia, we identify 
flow direction. Third, using the water flow direction we identify a border for each department as 
a reference point to measure a distance from the municipality until the point where the main river 
abandons the department toward the next. Similarly, we identify an international border for each 
hydrological region where the river abandons the country toward other country or the oceans.  
After defining the set of rivers and joining this information with the municipal and 
department boundaries, we propose to use a concept of distance that relates the municipal border 
to the departmental border, as well as an international border. At this step, we seek to answer 
these three questions: (1) does the municipality lies along a departmental border?, (2) is the 
municipality located upstream or downstream of a waterway? and (3) does this municipality lie 
along an international border? 
Figure 17 shows our categorization of each municipality within these definitions. We 
consider not only their location relative to the department border, but also the river flow 
direction. Consider a country formed by four departments, and several municipalities within each 
of these, and consider a river flowing left to right crossing the country from northwest to 
southeast. Under these conditions, a municipality located in the Department A is upstream of any 
municipality located at Department B and Department D. Within a Department A, municipality 
A2 is upstream and interior, meanwhile municipality A1 is downstream A2, and at the border of 
Department A. In this case, the benefit of allocating wastewater treatment resources within 
department A is higher at the interior of the department, in other words in municipalities like A2, 
                                                          
18
 See Table 31 in the Appendix. 
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than at the border in A1 and similar municipalities. Department B faces a similar situation 
regarding their own municipalities. In this case, B2 is likely to receive more support from the 
Department government than B1.  
Figure 17. Categorization of Municipalities regarding Location 
 
 
These definitions are helpful to understand the hypotheses previously stated in the 
conceptual framework. First, from the department A and B examples, we see that departmental 
governments send greater amount of resources when the municipality is located upstream (in-
department) relative to municipalities downstream (on-border); Second, the central government 
earmarks for investments in wastewater treatment increases when the municipality is located 
upstream (in-country). In general, we argue that the amount of environmental investments, in 
other words wastewater treatment, is greater as the distance from the municipality to the 
department border or to the international border increases. 
5.2. Empirical Specification 
This study examines the effect of location, relative to a border, on the municipal 
wastewater management investments in Colombia. Let yit denote the environmental investment 
made by a municipality i at time t. Let Di and Ii represents distance measurements relative to a 
department border and an international border respectively.  First, we estimate the effect of 
distance on municipal investments, but then, there are additional covariates that we assume can 
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affect municipal environmental investments Xit, as well as regional characteristics (ri), municipal 
categories (ci) and time specific characteristics (tt). Therefore, the more general specification for 
our model is given by the following equation: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐𝐼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 .     (25) 
Our set of estimations include all wastewater related municipal investments, and include 
as controls general municipal characteristics (Gross Domestic Product, Population, Land area 
and altitude), budget variables (tax revenues, transfer revenues and capital revenues), and 
includes dummies for presence of minorities within the municipality, and presence of conflict in 
the municipality.   
As alternative specifications, we assess a non-linear effect of the distance on the 
wastewater management investments. First, we include a quadratic term for both the department 
and the international distance.  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖
2 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑖
2 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡      (26) 
Likewise, we create splines for the distance measures to check whether the effect of 
distance differs across splines.  Therefore, the effect of distance for those municipalities located 
at a distance in the first spline (D
*
i) is given by β1, the effect for those municipalities located 
within the second spline (D
**
i) is given by β1+β2, and the effect for those municipalities located 
in the third spline (D
***
i) is given by β1+β2+β3. A similar logic follows for the international 
distance splines: 






∗∗∗ + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑡 +
𝑖𝑡 .               (27) 
6. Empirical Results 
To understand how the relative location of a municipality can affect the amount of 
investments on wastewater management, we estimate a set of models assessing the effect of 
distance relative to a domestic or to an international border. We present first different estimations 
including as explanatory variable the distance to a department border. Second, we estimate 
adding a distance to an international border within these estimations; and finally, we create 
splines to check for non-linear effects of the distance on municipal investments.  
a) Location relative to a Department border (domestic border)  
Table 24 show that the distance with respect to a Department border has an effect on the 
investments in wastewater treatment on the municipalities. Column 1 does not include controls 
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for general characteristics, budget variables or any dummy for region or time effects, and 
indicates that an increase in 1 km in the distance relative to the border reduces the investments 
by 9.6%.  Column 2 adds measure for general characteristics such as Gross Domestic Product, 
population, land area and altitude, as well as fixed effects for region and time, and the effect of 
distance changes to an increase in 4.1% the investments on wastewater treatment management. 
Column 3 includes budget variables (tax revenues, transfer revenues, and capital revenues) and 
drops to 3.0%.  Columns 4 and 5 include a variable for municipal category, which is an indicator 
summarizing population and total revenue, and shows on average an effect of 2.2% increase in 
the municipal investments as the distance increases.  The OLS estimates in Table 24 are 
therefore consistent with the hypothesis that the wastewater management investments in a 
municipality are positively affected by the location (distance) relative to a department (domestic) 
border.  
 
Table 24. Log-Log Distance to Department border 
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Location on Wastewater related municipal investments 
Dependent variable: Log of Municipal water related investments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Distance to Dept. Border (log) -0.09647*** 0.04174*** 0.03033*** 0.02254*** 0.02221** 
 
[0.00000] [0.00011] [0.00048] [0.00937] [0.01425] 
      General characteristics 
 
X X X X 
Budget variables 
  
X X X 
Other variables 
    
X 
      Region Dummies 
 
X X X X 
Year Dummies 
 
X X X X 
Municipal Category Dummy 
   
X X 
      Observations 14,622 10,333 9,940 9,940 9,940 
R-squared 0.00491 0.51850 0.67481 0.65278 0.65341 
Robust pval in brackets 
     *** p<0.01,  ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Table 25Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference. shows that the location at a 
department border has an effect on the investments in wastewater treatment on the 
municipalities. Similar to the continuous case, column 1 indicates that a municipality located at 
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the border of a department has a positive and significant effect on the municipal investments on 
wastewater treatment management.  However, Columns 3, 4, and 5 reveal a negative effect for 
those municipalities located at the department border on the wastewater investment.    
Table 25. Log-Log Dept. Border Indicator 
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Location on Wastewater related municipal investments 
Dependent variable: Log of Municipal wastewater related investments 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Dept. Border indicator 0.18967*** -0.00791 -0.03544*** -0.03052** -0.03279*** 
 
[0.00000] [0.59026] [0.00320] [0.01118] [0.00746] 
      General characteristics 
 
X X X X 
Budget variables 
  
X X X 
Other variables 
    
X 
      Region Dummies 
 
X X X X 
Year Dummies 
 
X X X X 
Municipal Category Dummies 
   
X X 
      Observations 15,014 10,605 10,195 10,195 10,195 
R-squared 0.00838 0.51271 0.64486 0.64613 0.64680 
Robust pval in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
b) Location relative to a Domestic and an international border 
Table 26 shows that when including the distance to the department border (domestic) and 
the distance to the international border (international), the distance to the department border 
influences the investments in wastewater treatment on the municipalities, but the effect of the 
international border vanishes. Column 1 shows a first estimation that does not include any 
control, and indicates that the effects of both distances are negative on the municipal investments 
on wastewater treatment. Column 2 includes general characteristics, regional dummies, and year 
dummies as controls, and shows that both distances have a statistically significant effect, 
however, when including additional controls the effect of the international distance vanishes, and 
the effect of the domestic distance remains positive meaning greater investments on wastewater 
treatment as the distance relative to the international border increases (columns 3-5). This OLS 
estimates in Table 26 test the hypothesis that distance with respect to a department border 
(domestic) affects positively the wastewater management investments in a municipality.   
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Table 26. Log-Log Department and International Distances 
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Location on Wastewater related municipal investments 
Dependent variable: Log of Municipal wastewater investments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Distance to Intl. Border (log) -0.17672*** 0.10859*** 0.02311 0.02310 0.01481 
 
[0.00000] [0.00001] [0.24592] [0.25295] [0.54970] 
Distance to Dept. Border (log) -0.08116*** 0.05574*** 0.04686*** 0.03724*** 0.03624*** 
 
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00019] [0.00025] 
      General characteristics 
 
X X X X 
Budget variables 
  
X X X 
Other variables 
    
X 
      Region dummies 
 
X X X X 
Year dummies 
 
X X X X 
Municipal category dummies 
   
X X 
      Observations 12,330 8,722 8,404 8,404 8,404 
R-squared 0.01685 0.52278 0.66927 0.66911 0.66983 
Robust pval in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
c) Department and international border: quadratic form  
As a robustness check, we estimate the effect of domestic and international distance on 
the investments in wastewater treatment on municipalities including a quadratic form.  Table 27 
Column 1 does not include any control, and indicates that both distances, domestic and 
international, have a positive effect on the municipal investments on wastewater treatment 
management until a turning point where the effect becomes negative, supporting the hypothesis 
of decreasing investments at the margin. Column 2 includes general characteristics for the 
municipalities, as well as region and year dummies, and indicates that the effect of the 
international distance on the wastewater treatment management investments is positive and 
decreasing, similarly for the domestic distance. Columns 3-5 includes controls related to budget 
variables, and shows that domestic distances have a positive and decreasing effect on the 
municipal investments on wastewater treatment, meanwhile the international distance have a 




Table 27. Log-Log Department and International Distances (including quadratic term) 
  OLS Estimates of the Effect of Location on Wastewater related municipal investments 
Dependent variable: Log of Municipal water related investments  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Distance to Intl. Border 0.30919* 0.58412*** -0.75004*** -0.59207*** -0.78039*** 
 
[0.06718] [0.00053] [0.00000] [0.00002] [0.00000] 
Distance to Intl. Border Sqr. -0.04463*** -0.04646*** 0.06697*** 0.05249*** 0.07281*** 
 
[0.00350] [0.00157] [0.00000] [0.00001] [0.00000] 
Distance to Dept. Border 0.46307*** 0.59476*** 0.48125*** 0.49871*** 0.50731*** 
 
[0.00001] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Distance to Dept. Border Sqr -0.06433*** -0.06457*** -0.05054*** -0.05391*** -0.05560*** 
 
[0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] 
      General characteristics 
 
X X X X 
Budget variables 
  
X X X 
Other variables 
    
X 
      Region dummies 
 
X X X X 
Year dummies 
 
X X X X 
Municipal category 
dummies 
   
X X 
      
      Observations 12,330 8,722 8,404 8,404 8,404 
R-squared 0.01956 0.52533 0.67197 0.67140 0.67238 
Robust pval in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
d) Domestic and international border: Splines 
As a second robustness check, we create splines using the measures of distance to both 
the domestic and the international border. To verify the nonlinear effect of distance on the 
municipal investments, we divide the distance measures into three knots using a linear spline, so 
we can estimate the effect of different distances on the municipal investments on wastewater 
treatment.   
 Regarding the distance with respect to the department border, we define three knots. 
First, municipalities located in a distance lower than 50 kms from the department border; second 
municipalities located within 50-100 kms; and third, municipalities located farther than 100 kms 
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from the department border. Similarly, we define three knots for the international distance, 
starting with departments located within a distance lower than 200 kms, following departments 
with a distance within 200-300 kms, and finally, departments located at a distance greater than 
300 kms.  
Table 28 show the results for the domestic distance, column 1 indicates a negative effect 
for those municipalities located at less than 50 kms (0.42%), meanwhile the effect of the distance 
for municipalities within 50-100 km is still negative (-0.28%), and those municipalities located at 
a distance greater than 100 kms is positive (0.12%). Column 2 includes controls for general 
characteristics, and region and year dummies, and indicates no effect of the distance for the 
municipalities located at a distance less than 50 km of the department border, but a positive 
effect for the other two knots. Columns 3-5 add budgetary variables as controls, and indicate a 
negative effect on those municipalities located more than 100 km from the department border. 
Meanwhile for the international distance (Table 28), column 1 indicates that those 
municipalities located less than 200 kms experiment a positive effect on municipal investments 
on wastewater management investments, but the sign of the effect reverses as for those located 
between 200 and 300 km, and those located more than 300 kms. Column 2 includes controls for 
general characteristics, region and year dummies, and indicates no statistically significant effect 
of the international distances on the municipal investments on wastewater management. Columns 
3-5 add budgetary variables, other variables, and municipal categories as controls, and they 
indicate a negative effect on those municipalities located more than 100 km from the department 
border; however, for the international distances they indicate a negative effect for those located 
less than 200 km from the international border, but a positive effect for those located within 200-
300 km, and those located more than 300 km from the international border.  
In sum, distances have an effect on wastewater management investment at the municipal 
level. This impact is consistent when it comes to distance relative to the department border, using 
a continuous measure, as well as it confirms the expected effect a binary measure for the location 
(interior or border). If we include the international distance measure, the effect of the distance to 
a departmental border remains significantly positive. Similarly, the significantly positive effect 
of the distance to a departmental border remains with the inclusion of quadratic terms. These 
results are consistent with the notion that intra-national governments induce municipalities 
located at an intra-national border to invest less in environmental management (Cai et al., 2016; 
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Duvivier and Xiong, 2013). We do not reach the same conclusion for the measure of 
international distance. Although the effect proves significantly positive in the parsimonious 
model, significance vanishes once we include more control factors.   
Table 28. Log-Log Splines 
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Location on Wastewater related municipal investments 
Dependent variable: Log of Municipal water related investments  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
          
Dist. Dept. Border (<50) -0.00417*** -0.00098 0.00057 0.00050 0.00052 
 
[0.00030] [0.34481] [0.52944] [0.58436] [0.57115] 
Dist. Dept. Border 
 (50-100) 0.00142 0.00413*** 0.00164 0.00166 0.00159 
 
[0.37529] [0.00364] [0.18797] [0.19017] [0.21021] 
Dist. Dept. Border (>100) 0.00269*** -0.00404*** -0.00278*** -0.00283*** -0.00283*** 
 
[0.00009] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Dist. Intl. Border (<200) 0.00206*** 0.00031 -0.00098*** -0.00083*** -0.00081*** 
 
[0.00000] [0.32516] [0.00008] [0.00100] [0.00133] 
Dist. Intl. Border 
 (200-300) -0.00658*** -0.00067 0.00244*** 0.00252*** 0.00187** 
 
[0.00000] [0.50853] [0.00269] [0.00204] [0.02461] 
Dist. Intl. Border (>300) 0.00434*** 0.00027 -0.00130** -0.00158*** -0.00081 
 
[0.00000] [0.71597] [0.02949] [0.00845] [0.19628] 
      General characteristics 
 
X X X X 
Budget variables 
  
X X X 
Other variables 
    
X 
      Department dummies 
     Region dummies 
 
X X X X 
Year dummies 
 
X X X X 
Municipal category 
dummies 
   
X X 
      Observations 15,014 10,605 10,195 10,195 10,195 
R-squared 0.02733 0.51551 0.64752 0.64858 0.64951 
Robust pval in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
7. Conclusions 
This study analyzes the effects of location relative to a border on the municipal 
investments on wastewater management. In particular, it examines both the effect of domestic 
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distances, and international distances at the municipal level in the country of Colombia. The 
analysis controls for municipal characteristics, such as GDP, population, land area and municipal 
altitude; budget variables including municipal tax revenues, transfer from other government 
levels, and municipal capital revenues; geographic regional effects and time effects.  This 
empirical analysis examines municipal investments on wastewater management in the country of 
Colombia for the years 2000 to 2013.  
Estimation of the effect of distances on municipal investments on wastewater 
management generates the following results. First, considering solely the measure of distance to 
a department border we find a positive and statistically significant effect. This means that for an 
increase in 1 standard deviation in the distance relative to a department border, the municipal 
investments increase on average 0.02 standard deviation. The positive effect of the distance to a 
department distance remains consistent after various specifications, and the inclusion of the 
international distance measure.  
Second, considering the distance to an international border, the results are inconclusive. 
Although we expect a consistent and monotone relation between the distance to an international 
border and the investments on wastewater management, the significance of this measure 
vanishes when including additional controls such as municipal categories and budget variables. 
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Figure 18. Mayor Rivers in Colombia 
 





a) Appendix A. Figures 
Figure 19. Water Quality Index - Magdalena and Cauca Streams 
 
 
b) Appendix A. Conceptual framework 
The central government imposes a lower legal limit on the amount of abatement offered by the 
municipality, denoted L. If the municipality is caught falling below this legal minimum, the 
central government imposes a fine, denoted F, that represents a linear transformation of the 
difference between the municipal investment in abatement, am, and the legal abatement limit, L: 
F = α (L - am), where α is a positive constant. The municipality lowers the magnitude of this fine 
by investing more into abatement. 
c) Appendix B. Decentralization and Regulatory framework 
In the last three decades of the 20
th
 century, Colombia decentralized its government 
functions. As one of the first steps, the 1968 constitutional reform transferred responsibilities 
from the central government to the departments, allowing departmental governors to design and 
implement development plans and programs, as well as to fulfill other functions that lie below 
the ministerial capacities at the national level. Colombia reinforced this transfer of competencies 
in 1971 with the “Situado fiscal”, which dedicated a proportion of the national income to local 
administration for the provision of municipal services. During the same year, the national 
government crafted a system for sharing sales tax revenues with departments and municipalities, 
defining these revenues available for all purposes (Moncayo Jimenez, 2005). 
Decentralization can be horizontal or vertical (Steiner and Correa, 1994). In Colombia, 
this process was vertical because it transferred decision-making and resources to sub-national 
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levels – departments and municipalities. In particular, the central government delegated a 
multiplicity of functions to municipalities, including water systems, sewer systems, and 
environmental management (Valencia-Tello and Karam De Chueiri, 2014; Moncayo Jimenez, 
2005).19  This process not only included an increase in delegation of functions and resource 
decentralization, but also attempted to change access to and the provision of basic services in all 
the regions of the country. According to González (1994), the decentralized model implemented  
in Colombia was a copy of the fiscal federalism model, which main objective is to achieve local 
efficiency and a reduction in the central government expenditure. However, at the beginning of 
the process, some levels of centralization remained, due to institutional weaknesses at the 
municipal level (Valencia-Tello and Karam De Chueiri, 2014). Afterwards, the central 
government tried to correct the negative effects of the institutional design and to strength its 
regulatory capacity in two ways: (1) defining clearly departmental and municipal competencies 
regarding the provision of public services; and (2) conditioning municipal resources to a 
certification awarded by each department based on criteria established at the national level 
(Zapata-Cortés, 2016). Despite this decentralization, the central government designed a set of 
rules applicable to the budgetary process at the national and sub-national levels of government 
(DDT-DNP 2012) that allowed the central government to maintain some control.20 
By 2000, Colombia had completed its decentralization process. Due to this 
decentralization, municipal governments have the autonomy to govern their own environmental 
management constrained by the central government’s retained authority and authority delegated 
to departmental governments. 
 
Table 29 Regulatory Framework 
 
Executive Order 2811/1974 Natural Resources and Environment Protection National Code 
Act 99, 1993 National Environmental System – SINA 
Act 9, 1979 Sanitary National Code 
Executive Order 1594, 1984 Water use and Dumping 
Res. 1433, 2004 Wastewater treatment management plans – PSVM 
Res. 1096, 2000 Technical Regulations Water Supply and Sanitation Sector  
Executive order 2667, 2012 Retributive rates and contributions 
Act 142, 1994 Public Utilities National Regime 
Executive Order 3100, 2003 Stablish redistributive rates for environmental use 
Res. 372, 1998 Stablishes the minimum for redistributive env. Rates 
Executive Order 1180, 2003 Environmental licenses and permits 
Source: National Plan for Municipal wastewater treatment – MVADT (2004) 
                                                          
19
 Act 715, 2001. Art. 76.5.4 Identifies these activities: execute decontamination projects of water streams and water 
deposits affected by wastewater discharges, as well as disposition programs, elimination, and recycling of liquid and 
solid residuals, and controlling air pollutant emissions. 
20
 The central government created the Statue of Budget (Estuto Único de Presupuesto) – EUP, defining the 
budgetary process in Colombia and its different steps. Two main agents operate at the local level: major and 
municipal council. The major is responsible for local economic development, including allocating the municipal 
expenditure and investments according to the approved budget (DDT-DNP, 2012). The municipal council approves 
and authorizes budgetary revenues and expenditures. Similarly, two agents operate at the department level: governor 
and department assembly. Governors are responsible for regional economic development, designing plans and 
programs, and defining revenues and expenditures (DDT-DNP, 2012). The department assembly approves the plans, 
projects, and budgets proposed by the governor. 
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d) Appendix C. Data: 
 
Table 30. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
All wastewater related municipal 
investments (log)  15,014 13.5984 1.00838 8.39309 21.5289 
      Distance to international border 15,400 422.196 277.73 0 872.202 
Distance to department border 15,400 127.785 77.7554 0 428.956 
Distance to international border (log) 12,936 6.05318 0.67949 4.02019 6.77102 
Distance to department border (log) 14,980 4.6654 0.72676 1.79123 6.06136 
      GDP total (Log) 10,960 11.2735 1.28223 6.93638 18.4443 
Population (Log) 15,364 9.56382 1.08291 6.63857 15.8534 
Land area (Log) 15,400 5.76932 1.21467 2.70805 11.0925 
Altitude (Log) 15,400 6.23188 1.76994 0.69315 10.1354 
Tax revenues (log) 15,021 6.31476 1.67874 -3.5582 15.2227 
Transfer revenues (log) 14,705 6.27394 0.63122 -5.7617 11.2627 


























Table 31. Main Colombian Rivers defined by official sources 
Colombian Rivers Considered  
RÍO  USARAGA RÍO CUSAY RÍO MICAY RÍO SAN JUAN 
RÍO  USARAGÁ RÍO CUSIANA RÍO MIRA RÍO SAN LOPE 
RÍO ABAQUÍA RÍO DOCAMPADÓ RÍO MULATOS RÍO SAN LORENZO 
RÍO AGUACATAL RÍO DUDA RÍO MURINDÓ RÍO SAN MIGUEL 
RÍO AMAZONAS RÍO GAUAGUAQUÍ RÍO MURRÍ RÍO SAN PABLO 
RÍO APAPORIS RÍO GAZAUNTA RÍO NARE RÍO SANQUIANGA 
RÍO ARAUCA RÍO GIVIRU RÍO NAYA RÍO SATOCA 
RÍO ARIARI RÍO GUACAVÍA RÍO NECHÍ RÍO SEQUIHONDA 
RÍO ATABAPO RÍO GUAINÍA RÍO NEGRO RÍO SINÚ 
RÍO ATRATO RÍO GUAJUÍ RÍO NULPE RÍO SOGAMOSO 
RÍO BAUDO RÍO GUAMAL RÍO OPÓN RÍO SUCIO 
RÍO BOJABÁ RÍO GUAPE RÍO ORDO RÍO TAMANA 
RÍO BONGO RÍO GUAPI RÍO ORINOCO RÍO TAMBOR 
RÍO BUBUEY RÍO GUATIQUÍA RÍO ORPUA RÍO TAME 
RÍO CAGUÁN RÍO GUAVIARE RÍO ORTEGUAZA RÍO TANANDÓ 
RÍO CAJAMBRE RÍO GUAYABERO RÍO PATÍA RÍO TAPAJE 
RÍO CALAFITA RÍO GUAYAS RÍO PATÍA VIEJO RÍO TAPAJE VIEJO 
RÍO CAQUETÁ RÍO GUAYURIBA RÍO PICHIMA RÍO TARAIRÁ 
RÍO CARARE RÍO GUIZA RÍO PORCE RÍO TARAZA 
RÍO CASANARE RÍO HUMADEA RÍO PURARE RÍO TELEMBI 
RÍO CATRIPE RÍO HUMEA RÍO PURRICHA RÍO TIMBA GRANDE 
RÍO CAUCA Río IJUA RÍO QUIPARADÓ RÍO TIMBIQUÍ 
RÍO CERTEGUI RÍO ISCUANDÉ RÍO QUITO RÍO TIMBITA 
RÍO CIMITARRA RÍO LA CAL RÍO RAPOSO RÍO TOCARAGUA 
RÍO COBARÍA RÍO LA MIEL RÍO ROSARÍO RÍO TOLA 
RÍO CRAVO NORTE RÍO LA SIERPE RÍO ROTAYA RÍO TRAIRÁ (TARAIRÁ) 
RÍO CRAVO SUR RÍO LIMONES RÍO SAIJA RÍO TUA 
RÍO CUBUGÓN RÍO LOS URUIMES RÍO SALDAÑA RÍO UPÍA 
RÍO CUCUANA RÍO MAGDALENA RÍO SAMANÁ RÍO VAUPÉS 
RÍO CUCUNA RÍO META RÍO SAN JORGE RÍO VICHADA 
Río CURBARADÓ RÍO METICA RIO SAN JUAN RÍO YURUMANGUÍ 
Source: National Geographic Institute- Colombia 
Simple and Double drainage- Shape files 








e) Appendix D. Additional Results 
 
Table 32. Log-Log Department and International border Indicator 
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Location on Wastewater related municipal investments 
Dependent variable: Log of Municipal wastewater investments  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
International Border Ind. 0.01145 0.33409*** 0.33617*** 0.39168*** 0.53047*** 
 
[0.94114] [0.00003] [0.00001] [0.00000] [0.00185] 
Dept. Border indicator 0.01434 0.05174** -0.01836 -0.01825 -0.01831 
 
[0.60254] [0.02380] [0.31767] [0.31990] [0.31798] 
0b.dwborder#1.exterior -0.15142*** 0.06646** 0.01287 0.00741 0.00850 
 
[0.00001] [0.02810] [0.60396] [0.76522] [0.73211] 
      General characteristics 
 
X X X X 
Budget variables 
  
X X X 
Other variables 
    
X 
      Department dummies X X X X X 
Region dummies 
     Year dummies 
 
X X X X 
Municipal category 
dummies 
   
X X 
      Observations 15,014 10,605 10,195 10,195 10,195 
R-squared 0.13465 0.56199 0.66231 0.66537 0.66586 
Robust pval in brackets 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note to Table 32. P-values are in brackets. Data are from the Municipal Panel created by the Center for 
Development Studies – CEDE at Universidad de los Andes, using publicly available information from 
official sources, and include municipalities in Colombia between 2000 and 2013. General characteristics 
includes variables such as GDP, Population, land area and altitude; Budget variables includes tax 
revenues, capital revenues, and transfer revenues; and other variables include a dummy variable for the 
presence of land belonging to minorities within the municipality and a dummy variable for the presence 














Table 33. Log-Log Distance to International Border 
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Location on Wastewater related municipal investments 
Dependent variable: Log of Municipal water related investments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Distance to Intl. 
Border (log) -0.12003*** 0.02922 0.00532 0.03320** 0.02968* 
 
[0.00000] [0.15142] [0.73918] [0.03935] [0.06611] 
      General 
characteristics 
 
X X X X 
Budget variables 
  
X X X 
Other variables 
    
X 
      Department 
dummies X X X X X 
Region Dummies 
     Year Dummies 
 
X X X X 
Municipal category 
dummies 
   
X X 
      Observations 14,902 10,529 10,124 10,124 10,124 
R-squared 0.13378 0.56218 0.68336 0.66629 0.66681 
Robust pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note to Table 33. P-values are in brackets. Data are from the Municipal Panel created by the Center for 
Development Studies – CEDE at Universidad de los Andes, using publicly available information from 
official sources, and include municipalities in Colombia between 2000 and 2013. General characteristics 
includes variables such as GDP, Population, land area and altitude; Budget variables includes tax 
revenues, capital revenues, and transfer revenues; and other variables include a dummy variable for the 
presence of land belonging to minorities within the municipality and a dummy variable for the presence 
of at least one irregular army. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
